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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS OF MILITARY  
CHAPLAINS AND MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS:   
CASE LAW OF MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE 503 AND 513 
TARIK ABDEL-MONEM, JD/MPH,* MARK DEKRAAI JD/PHD,** 
DENISE BULLING, PHD/LMHP*** 
I. Introduction
Alarmingly high rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and
suicide among Service members returning from military action1 has 
increased focus within the United States military about effectively 
providing mental health services.2  Concerns include problems related to 
an insufficient mental health workforce, military culture, and delivery of 
services.3  Within this context, how sensitive personal information is 
handled while seeking mental healthcare is a major concern for 
servicemembers.  The Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. 
* Research Specialist at the University of Nebraska Public Policy Center.  J.D., 2002,
University of Iowa; M.P.H., 2002, University of Iowa.  This paper is based in part on
research conducted for the Department of Veterans Affairs: Chaplaincy Gap Analysis for
the Research, Education, and Clinical Center (MIRECC), Contract Number GS-10F-
0209U.  The views expressed in this article are those of the authors only and not the
Department of Veterans Affairs, their respective institutions or anyone else.
**  Senior Research Director at the University of Nebraska Public Policy Center.  Ph.D.,
1990, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; J.D., 1982, University of Nebraska.
***  Licensed professional counselor and certified threat manager serving as a senior
research director with the University of Nebraska Public Policy Center.  Ph.D., 2006,
University of Nebraska-Lincoln; M.A., University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1987.
1  See Robert H. Pietrzak et al., Risk and Protective Factors Associated with Suicidal
Ideation in Veterans of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, 123 J. OF 
AFFECT. DIS. 102, 102-07 (2010) (discussing rates of suicide among Iraq and Afghanistan
war service members and risk factors); Josefin Sundin et al., PTSD after deployment to
Iraq:  conflicting rates, conflicting claims, 40 PSYCH’L MED. 367, 367-82 (2010)
(discussing data and rates of PTSD prevalence among veterans following deployment to
the Middle East).
2  See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, PREVENTING PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS IN SERVICE
MEMBERS AND THEIR FAMILIES:  AN ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAMS 9-10 (2014) (discussing
the need to address mental health issues for military service members and their families in
the wake of deployment); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, RETURNING HOME FROM IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN:  READJUSTMENT NEEDS OF VETERANS, SERVICE MEMBERS, AND THEIR
FAMILIES 13-14 (2013) (outlining the scope of the military and estimates of mental health
issues among its members).
3  See Audrey Burnam et al., Mental Health Care for Iraq and Afghanistan War Veterans,
28 HEALTH AFF’S 771, 771-82 (providing an overview of mental health services and
challenges within the military in light of continued deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan).
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Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) recently partnered to examine 
opportunities for chaplains to have a role in improving mental health 
efforts, largely because of their well-respected place within military 
culture, and the absolute confidentiality they enjoy with 
communications.4 This initiative—the Integrated Mental Health 
Strategy—recognizes the important potential chaplains have to 
promote mental healthcare.5 However, it generates a need to address 
important practical concerns.  A primary issue is how chaplains and 
mental health providers can work—separately or together—to handle 
sensitive mental health information of servicemembers.6  This is a 
major concern because many servicemembers fear that disclosure of 
mental health issues can jeopardize their military careers if they are 
perceived as being unfit.7  At the same time, the appropriate 
handling of such information can be instrumental in helping 
servicemembers obtain assistance if needed.  This raises the question 
of what the current legal landscape is for the treatment of 
confidential information by either chaplains or mental health providers 
within military courts.  Military rules regarding privileged 
communications are currently the primary sources of guidance on these 
issues. This article provides an overview of applicable military case law 
on the treatment of privileged communications for both chaplains and 
mental health professionals.  After the introduction in Part I, Part II 
provides an overview of military chaplaincy, their potential role in 
addressing mental health needs among servicemembers, and a summary 
of the mental health landscape.  Part III focuses on a review of military 
cases concerning Military Rule of Evidence 503:  Communications to 
clergy.  It identifies the policy rationale behind the clergy privilege, and 
outlines major military appellate cases which have examined privileged 
communications under this rule for chaplains, many of which are 
relevant to situations involving instances of self-harm or harm to others.  
Part IV outlines case law concerning Military Rule of Evidence 513:  
Privileged Communications and Psychotherapists.  This section 
identifies the policy rationale of the psychotherapist privilege, and 
discusses major military appellate cases which have arisen since the 
privilege was created by presidential order in 
4  See infra discussion at notes 71-74. 
5  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE & DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, INTEGRATED MENTAL 
HEALTH Strategy (Sept. 2010). 
6  For example, HIPAA privacy protections for personal health information contains 
exceptions for servicemembers.  The military may access personal health information in 
order “to assure the proper execution of the military mission.”  45 CFR 164.512(k)(1)(i).  
7   See DoD Regulation 6025.18-R(C7.11.1.3) (allowing disclosure of health information 
to military command to determine fitness for duty)  
2017] Military Chaplains & Mental Health Professionals 291 
1999.  Finally, part V discusses the implications of this case law within the 
framework of the wider policy goals of each rule of evidence, and offers 
suggested guidance for those working in this area. 
II. Chaplaincy and Mental Health in the Military
Chaplains have been active in the nation’s military since General
George Washington requested them to serve in the continental army in 
1775.8  Congress first funded chaplaincy positions for the Army and Navy 
in 1791.9  Since then, chaplains have taken part in hundreds of military 
missions and served in over 120 countries.10  Chaplains occupy a unique 
space in military service.  As stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, chaplains’ 
main duties are to “accommodate religious needs, to provide religious and 
pastoral care, and to advise commanders on the complexities of religion 
with regard to its personnel and mission.”11  The military must provide for 
the free exercise of religion under the U.S. Constitution, so chaplains play 
a primary role in facilitating religious activities for troops and 
commanders.12  This includes advising commanders about religious 
affairs, ethical and moral issues, troop morale during all operations, and 
providing or facilitating religious worship and support.13  Thus, the 
historical and still most important function of military chaplains is to 
facilitate the free expression of religion within the services.14  
8 See The Chief of Chaplains, Strategic Roadmap:  Connecting Faith, Service, and 
Mission, ARMY.MIL 10 (n.d.), http://www.chapnet.army.mil/usachcs/pdf/chaplain_ 
roadmap.pdf (discussing history of American chaplaincy in military service); DEP’T OF 
ARMY, REG. 165-1, RELIGIOUS SUPPORT:  ARMY CHAPLAIN CORPS ACTIVITIES 1 (2009) 
[hereinafter RELIGIOUS SUPPORT].  
9 See CHARLOTTE HUNTER, A DEAL WITH THE DEVIL?  THE CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE 
IN THE U.S. MILITARY, 140-41 (2006) (discussing history of chaplains in U.S. armed 
forces).  
10 See The Chief of Chaplains, supra note 7, at 4 (summarizing service of chaplains in the 
U.S. military). 
11  JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS IN JOINT OPERATIONS, JOINT PUBLICATION 
1-05, I-1 (Nov. 2013) [hereinafter JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF].
12  See id. at I-1–2 (discussing the role of chaplains in military service). 
13  See id. at II-1 (outlining religious advisement and support activities of chaplains).  See 
also Jonathan G. Odom, Beyond Arm Bands and Arms Banned:  Chaplains, Armed Conflict, 
and the Law, 49 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 5-8 (2002) (discussing historical role of chaplains in the 
U.S. military).  
14 See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF supra note 11 at I-1 (“US military chaplains are a unique 
manifestation of the nation's commitment to the values of freedom and conscience and free 
exercise of religion proclaimed in her founding documents."). 
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Some commentators have questioned the constitutionality of military-
supported chaplaincy, arguing that it amounts to an establishment of 
religion.15  However, the services have emphasized the fundamental 
importance of chaplaincy in maintaining freedom of religious expression 
within the military.16  Although these broad legal questions have been 
discussed elsewhere, it is worth recognizing that federal courts have ruled 
in favor of the constitutionality of military and government-sponsored 
chaplaincy.17  
Contemporary chaplains play many day-to-day roles in the military. 
Obvious examples include providing sacramental rites and religious 
services for service members, advising command on troop morale, and 
coordinating educational, community, family, or recreational activities.18 
Yet beyond religious services and counseling, a major role of chaplains in 
both operational and garrison settings is monitoring the emotional well-
being of servicemembers, in either informal or formal settings.  This is 
what chaplains commonly refer to as providing a “ministry of presence”—
a mix of emotional and social support, frequent visitation, clinical pastoral 
15  See William J. Dobosh, Coercion in the Ranks:  The Establishment Clause Implications 
of Chaplain-Led Prayers at Mandatory Army Events, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1493, 1499-1530 
(2006) (discussing various establishment clause tests and their applicability to chaplaincy 
sponsored by the government); Steven K. Green, Reconciling the Irreconcilable:  Military 
Chaplains and the First Amendment, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 174-81 (2007) (discussing 
and critiquing the reasoning behind the Katcoff v. Marsh decision); Andy G. Olree, James 
Madison and Legislative Chaplains, 102 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 145, 185-86 (2008) 
(noting James Madison’s support for chaplains in military service around the time of the 
War of 1812); Richard D. Risen, Katcoff v. Marsh at Twenty-One:  The Military 
Chaplaincy and the Separation of Church and State, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 1137, 1138-42 
(2006) (discussing the history and merits of the Katcoff v. Marsh case). 
16 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . .”).  See also Emilie Kraft Bindon, Entangled Choices:  Selecting Chaplains 
for the United States Armed Forces, 56 ALA. L. REV. 247, 247-53 (2004) (discussing the 
case of James Yee and the obligations of military chaplains); JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT 
PUB. 1-05, RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS IN JOINT OPERATIONS I-1(Nov. 2013) (noting the obligation 
of military chaplains to ensure freedom of religion). 
17  See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (finding the use of government-sponsored 
chaplains in state legislatures to be constitutional); Katcoff v. Marsh, 582 F. Supp. 463 
(E.D.N.Y 1984) (finding the use of chaplains in the U.S. military to be constitutional). 
18  See generally RELIGIOUS SUPPORT, supra note 8, para. 1-2–1-7 (outlining the roles of 
chaplains in the Army); U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, OPNAV INSTR. 1730.1E, 4-7 (Apr. 2012) 
(outlining the duties and responsibilities of chaplains in the Navy); NANCY B. KENNEDY,
MIRACLES & MOMENTS OF GRACE 20-232 (2011) (presenting stories of chaplain 
experiences and activities in the armed forces); Pauletta Otis, An Overview of the U.S. 
Military Chaplaincy:  A Ministry of Presence and Practice, 7 REV. OF FAITH & INT’L AFF’S 
3, 3-10 (2009) (providing an overview of military chaplains). 
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counseling, or religious ministry for those who request it.19  Because many 
chaplains in deployment settings are literally where the Soldiers, Marines, 
Airmen/women or Sailors are, they play a critical role in triaging those 
individuals in need of help by determining whet her the need is for 
emotional “first aid,” or more intensive clinical care by professionals.20  
Some servicemembers are more likely to seek out chaplains to discuss 
emotional or mental health issues than they would with mental health 
professionals.  This is because within military culture there may be less 
stigma21 attached to talking with a chaplain than with a mental health 
professional.  Chaplains are more accessible, and mental health 
professionals are not obliged to the same standards of confidentiality as 
19 See Bruce W. Crouterfield, The Value of the Naval Chaplain in the Fleet Marine Force 
Environment (Doctor of Ministry Thesis) 18-26 (Mar. 2009) (discussing the roles and 
responsibilities of naval chaplains during deployment); Mark A. Tinsley, The Ministry of 
Service:  A Critical Practico-theological Examination of the Ministry of Presence and its 
Reformulation for Military Chaplains 11-70 (Jan. 2012) (unpublished Master of Theology 
Thesis, Liberty University) (on file with Liberty University) (discussing the ministry of 
presence, its dynamics and limitations).  
20  See Denise Bulling et al., Confidentiality and Mental Health/Chaplaincy 
Collaboration, 25 MIL. PSYCH. 557, 558 (2014) (discussing the roles of chaplains within 
the military services). 
21  Military culture is generally considered to be unconducive to discussions about 
mental health. See affidavit of James Anthony Martin in U.S. v Kreutzer, 59 M.J. 773, 
813 (2004): 
The peculiar culture at Fort Bragg was a tremendous influence in this 
case.  The pervasive atmosphere at Fort Bragg was that soldiers with 
mental health problems should not seek mental health services. 
Soldiers with mental health problems need to “suck it up and drive on” 
and failure due to mental health falls into the area of “no excuses.” 
Id.  See also Paul Y. Kim, Thomas W. Britt, Robert P. Klocko, Lyndon A. Riviere, & Amy 
B. Adler, Stigma, Negative Attitudes About Treatment, and Utilization of Mental Health
Care Among Soldiers, 23 MIL. PSYCH. 65, 65-81 (2011) (discussing impact of attitudes
toward mental health care and impact among mental health care usage among Iraq and
Afghanistan servicemembers); Robert H. Pietrzak et al., Perceived Stigma and Barriers to
Mental Health Care Utilization Among OEF-OIF Veterans, 60 PSYCH. SERV. 1118, 1118-
22 (2009) (discussing stigma and barriers to mental health care among Iraq and
Afghanistan war veterans); Tiffany Greene-Shortridge, Thomas Britt, & Carl Andrew, The 
Stigma of Mental Health Problems in the Military, 172 MIL. MED. 157, 157-61 (2007)
(discussing the problem of stigma in the military generally towards individuals with mental
health issues).  Generally speaking, servicemembers would prefer to visit a chaplain rather
than a mental health professional because of the knowledge that chaplains enjoy higher
confidentiality protections.  See Barbara J. Zanotti & Rick A. Becker, Matching To The
Beat of A Different Drummer:  Is Military Law and Mental Health Out-of-Step after Jaffee
v. Redmond?, 41 AIR FORCE L. REV. 66-67 (1997) (discussing the stigma surrounding
mental health care and the preference for chaplains among service members).
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are chaplains.22  Chaplains are professionally and ethically obliged to 
maintain strict confidentiality in all matters, principally to maintain 
absolute trust and confidence.23  Legally, individuals have an official 
privilege to prevent their communications to clergy from being 
disclosed.24  This is codified in the Military Rule of Evidence 503, 
Communications to clergy, which remains a near absolute privilege.25  In 
contrast, Military Rule of Evidence 513, psychotherapist-patient privilege, 
permits exceptions to the privilege to prevent disclosure in cases of child 
abuse or neglect, legal obligations, safety to the person or others, future 
commission of crime or fraud, or anything else that would jeopardize 
safety of military personnel, property or mission.26     
There is a profound contrast in the absolute privilege that chaplains 
enjoy, versus that of the psychotherapist.  This has resulted in a defacto 
situation where servicemembers will prefer to speak about their actions 
with chaplains rather than mental health professionals about behavior that 
may be illegal, pose dangers to themselves or others, or jeopardize their 
military careers or family lives.  This defacto reality is acknowledged in 
United States v. Thompson (C.A.A.F. 1999),27 in which a military attorney 
involved in a claim for effective assistance of council testified as to why 
he always advises military clients to confer with chaplains rather than 
mental health professionals: 
22  For a discussion of attitudes towards military mental health professionals prior to the 
establishment of a confidential privilege in communications, see James Corcoran & John 
Breeskin, Absence of Privileged Communications and its Impact on Air Force Officers, 19 
A.F.L.REV. 51 (1977).  In this article, the authors discuss the results of a survey of U.S. 
Air Force officers and their preferences regarding whom to seek out to disclose personal 
mental health matters.  Results indicated that chaplains were the most cited category of 
professionals to seek out, and that officers would also strongly prefer civilian mental health 
professionals rather than military ones.  The main reason for these choices was the lack of 
confidentiality and fear that matters disclosed to military mental health professionals could 
damage the careers of officers if they were disclosed to command. 
23  See ROBERT C. LYONS, A CHAPLAIN’S GUIDE TO PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION (Master 
of Theology Thesis) 70-79 (2001) (discussing the expectation of strict confidentiality 
among chaplains).  See also DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, RELIGIOUS SUPPORT:  ARMY 
CHAPLAIN CORPS ACTIVITIES, ARMY REGULATION 165-1, 49-50 (2009) (outlining the 
definition and parameters of privileged communications under U.S. Army regulations). 
But see Jonathan G. Odom, Beyond Arm Bands and Arms Banned:  Chaplains, Armed 
Conflict, and the Law, 49 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 58-59 (2002) (noting that definitions of 
privileged communications and confidentiality differ between the services).  
24  Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, MIL. R. EVID. 503 (2016) [hereinafter MCM]. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. at r. 513 
27  51 M.J. 431 (C.A.A.F. 1999). 
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I remember him being distraught and informed him I was not 
a counselor.  However, I advised him to talk with a priest or a 
chaplain, because of the penitent-priest privilege.  I informed 
him there would be no confidentiality with mental health.  It 
has been my habit to inform my clients they could talk to 
anybody, but I recommend they talk only to my paralegal, a 
chaplain, or me about the case, because of confidentiality.  I 
never prohibited a client from speaking to or seeking help 
from someone other than myself, my defense paralegal, or 
chaplain; however, I always warned them of the possible 
consequences.28 
Because of both the surge in mental health needs among the military, 
and a defacto culture which places less stigma on conferring with 
chaplains rather than psychotherapists, there has been renewed focus on 
utilizing military chaplains as key front-line personnel in military mental 
health.  In 2010, the DoD and DVA developed the Integrated Mental 
Health Strategy (IMHS).29  The purpose of the IMHS was to develop a 
coordinated and comprehensive strategy to address mental health among 
active duty service members, reserve and guard members, veterans, and 
family.30  The initiative was a direct response to the mental health needs 
of those serving in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.31  In particular, Strategic Action #23 of the IMHS focused on 
the role of chaplains in improving services for integrated mental health 
and spiritual care in the DVA system, and how chaplains can facilitate 
continuity of mental health care between the armed services, DVA system, 
and community.32   
28  Id. at 434. 
29  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE & DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, INTEGRATED MENTAL 
HEALTH Strategy (Sept. 2010). 
30  See id. at 2 (“The Departments will advance an integrated and coordinated public health 
model to improve the access, quality, effectiveness, and efficiency of mental health 
services for all Active Duty Service members, National Guard and Reserve members, 
Veterans, and their families.”). 
31  See id. (“The population of [servicemembers] and Veterans with mental health needs 
continues to grow.  Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the war in Afghanistan, and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the war in Iraq, are the longest wars in U.S. history that 
have been fought with an all-volunteer force.”). 
32  See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE & DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, INTEGRATED
MENTAL HEALTH Strategy 119-23 (Sept. 2010) (outlining Strategic Action #23–Chaplains 
role). 
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The practical implications of chaplains’ involvement in mental health 
support are profound.  By providing ministry, presence, and formal or 
informal pastoral counseling, chaplains can identify individuals in need of 
assistance.  Operational settings present significant mental health stresses: 
continued deployments,33 marital separation,34 combat trauma, injury, or 
death.  This puts servicemembers at long-term risk for drug or alcohol 
abuse, post-traumatic stress disorder,35 serious or terminal illnesses, and 
long-term spiritual injuries.36  Chaplains are well-placed to refer serious 
cases of concern to mental health professionals.  Commenters have 
discussed collaborative practices and models in which chaplains can work 
with mental health professionals in operational settings to triage or refer 
personnel for adequate help.37  These practices leverage the accessibility 
and lack of stigma that chaplains enjoy, and link them with mental health 
and health care professionals.38  
33  See Joshua E. Buckman et al., The Impact of Deployment Length on the Health and 
Well-being of Military Personnel:  A Systematic Review of the Literature, 68 OCCUP’L & 
ENVIR’L MED. 69, 69-76 (2011) (discussing findings from a meta-analysis of studies on the 
impacts of deployment length on health outcomes and noting that longer deployment 
generally resulted in worse outcomes). 
34  See Major Peter S. Jensen, at al., The Military Family in Review:  Context, Risk, and 
Prevention, 25 J. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD PSYCH’Y 225-34 (1986) (discussing reviews of 
studies on military families, including the impacts of marital separation). 
35  See J. Douglas Brenner et al., Chronic PTSD in Vietnam Combat Veterans:  Course of 
Illness and Substance Abuse, 153 AM. J. PSYCH’Y 369-75 (1996) (discussing onset and 
development of PTSD and substance abuse among veterans of the Vietnam War over an 
extended period); Matthew Jakupcak et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder as a Risk Factor 
for Suicidal Ideation in Iraq and Afghanistan War Veterans, 22 J. TRAUM. STRESS 303-06 
(2009) (discussing prevalence of PTSD and other mental illnesses and risk for suicidal 
ideation among veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan wars); Miles E. McFall et al., Combat-
related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Severity of Substance Abuse in Vietnam 
Veterans, 53 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL & DRUGS 357-63 (1992) (discussing impacts of PTSD 
on substance abuse outcomes among Vietnam veterans).  
36  See Kent D. Drescher et al., An Exploration of the Viability and Usefulness of the 
Construct of Moral Injury in War Veterans, 19 TRAUM’Y 243-50 (2013) (outlining the 
construct and presence of spiritual or moral injuries among war veterans from the 
perspectives of chaplains and health professionals); Brett T. Litz, Nathan Stein, Eileen 
Delaney, Leslie Lebowitz, William P. Nash, Caroline Silva, & Shira Maguen, Moral Injury 
and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A Preliminary Model and Intervention Strategy, 29 
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY REV. 695-706 (2009) (discussing the concept of moral or spiritual 
injury among veterans and potential interventions). 
37  See Jason A. Nieuwsma et al., Chaplaincy and mental health in the Department of 
Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense, 19 J. HEALTH CARE CHAPLAINCY 3, 4-14 
(2013) (discussing recent initiatives in which chaplains in the DoD and DVA have 
identified strategies for collaboration with mental health professionals) 
38  See Frank C. Budd, An Air Force Model of Psychologist-Chaplain Collaboration, 30 
PROF’L PSYCH.:  RES. & PRACTICE 552-56 (1999) (discussing and recommending the need 
for greater collaboration between mental health professionals and chaplains); Michael D. 
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The active duty contexts in which mental health professionals work 
varies widely, and depends on the service branch, deployment status or 
garrison environment.  Depending on the situation, a range of formal 
counseling or behavioral health services can be available.39 Much 
emphasis has been placed on meeting the needs of those deployed for 
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  For example, 
the United States Army has structured its Comprehensive Behavioral 
Health System of Care (CBHSOC) to align with force deployment 
cycles.40  This initiative is intended to provide a seamless system of care 
from screening to treatment during all phases of active duty, and employs 
the use of embedded mental health professionals within units.41  Within 
the Army, division psychiatrists still oversee all clinical activities within 
command positions, and as part of their duties are regularly expected to 
coordinate with medical personnel, chaplains, social workers and other 
command officers.42  In addition to providing direct clinical services, these 
psychiatrists and mental health specialists are also responsible for 
command directed evaluations, general and specialized screenings and 
clearance evaluations, medical evaluation and forensic examinations, and 
suicide incident-related activities, both in garrison and during active 
deployment.43  The Marine Corps has evolved a similar model called 
OSCAR (Operational Stress Control and Readiness), in which 
psychiatrists, psychologists, and psychiatric technicians are embedded 
Howard & Ruth P. Cox, Collaborative Intervention:  A Model for Coordinated Treatment 
of Mental Health Issue within a Ground Combat Unit, 173 MIL. MED. 339-48 (2008) 
(discussing models for collaborative practices between unit chaplains and mental health 
officers). 
39 See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, & 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON 
MILITARY AND VETERANS MENTAL HEALTH 12-16 (2013) (listing a variety of services for 
suicide prevention and mental health services within each of the four service branches). 
40 See REBECCA PORTER, THE ARMY COMPREHENSIVE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SYSTEM OF
CARE (CBHSOC) CAMPAIGN PLAN:  STANDARDIZE TO OPTIMIZE (2011).  
41  See Christopher Warner et al., Division Mental Health in the New Brigade Combat 
Team Structure: Part I. Predeployment and Deployment, 172 MIL. MED. 907, 907-11 
(2007) (describing structure of clinical services within Task Force Baghdad in pre-
deployment and deployment); Christopher Warner et al., Division Mental Health in the 
New Brigade Combat Team Structure:  Part II.  Redeployment and Post Deployment, 
172 MILI. MED. 907, 912-17 (2007) (describing structure of clinical services within 
Task Force Baghdad in redeployment and post deployment).  
42  See Christopher Warner et al., The Evolving Roles of the Division Psychiatrist, 172 
MILITARY MEDICINE 918, 918-924 (2007) (discussing overall restructuring of mental health 
resources within Army and role of the division psychiatrist). 
43  See id. at 921 (outlining roles of Army division mental health). 
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with combat units through deployment.44  The purpose of the embedding 
is to intentionally expose the mental health provider to the Marine in 
combat and vice versa, so repeated contact creates trust and facilitates 
early monitoring, intervention and treatment.45  
 
Despite the presence of mental health resources, confidentiality 
remains a principal barrier to seeking help from mental health 
professionals.  An anonymous survey of Army Soldiers post-deployment 
from Iraq or Afghanistan revealed up to four times the rate of depression 
or PTSD than those reported on standard questionnaires.46 A study 
involving incidence of child sexual abuse indicated that Navy Sailors were 
far more likely to report experiences on anonymous surveys rather than 
screenings requiring identification.47 The principal concern with 
disclosing mental health problems is that doing so will jeopardize one’s 
security clearance or entire military career.48 For this reason, mental health 
professionals in the armed services are widely known as “wizards” – 
because they can make one “disappear” from the unit, or service 
altogether.49 Indeed, under the Health Insurance Portability and 
                                                          
44  See William Nash, Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR): The United 
States Marine Corps Initiative to Deliver Mental Health Services to Operating Forces 1-
10 (2006) (describing the OSCAR model and its creation and objectives). 
45   See id. at 6-8 (discussing the functions of the OSCAR team). 
46  See Christopher Warner et al., Importance of Anonymity to Encourage Honest Reporting 
in Mental Health Screening After Combat Deployment, 68 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL 
PSYCHIATRY 1065, 1065-1071 (2011) (discussing findings from the use of anonymous post 
deployment surveys compared to standard screening instruments and finding much higher 
rates of depression and PTSD in anonymous surveys). 
47 See Cheryl Olson, Valerie Stander, & Lex Merrill, The Influence of Survey 
Confidentiality and Construct Measurement in Estimating Rates of Childhood 
Victimization Among Navy Recruits, 16 MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY 53, 53-69 (2004) 
(discussing results from anonymous and non-anonymous survey conditions for 
questionnaire involving child sexual experiences). 
48  See Camilla Schwoebel & Roger Schlimbach, Confidentiality: A Conundrum in 
Veterans Behavioral Health Care, 32 DEVELOPMENTS IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW 1, 1 (2013) 
(discussing the example of a Navy Sailor worried about a PTSD diagnosis that would be a 
“career ender”). 
49   See David A. Litts, Suicide and Veterans, What we Know, How We Can Help, HEALTH 
PROGRESS: JOURNAL OF THE CATHOLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES 24, 27 
(May – June 2013) (“In some sectors of military culture, mental health professionals are 
called ‘wizards.’ Go to the ‘wizard’ and he’ll make you disappear — from your military 
unit that is — and leave you stereotyped as someone with a weak character.”); William 
Nash, Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR): The United States Marine 
Corps Initiative to Deliver Mental Health Services to Operating Forces 1, 2 (2006) (“In 
U.S. military services, a common derogatory term for psychiatrists and psychologists 
among the troops is “wizard,” referring disparagingly to mental health professionals’ one 
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Accountability Act (HIPAA), which governs the management of personal 
health information, specific exceptions are made for military service 
members.  Otherwise protected health information under the HIPAA 
privacy rule may be provided to military command to assure “proper 
execution of the military mission.”50  
Department of Defense health information privacy regulations allow 
for the disclosure of health information about service members if it is 
deemed necessary by command to properly execute a military mission,51 
to determine the member’s general fitness for duty,52 and to determine a 
member’s fitness to perform a particular mission or activity.53  Although 
the DoD regulations do distinguish between general medical records and 
psychotherapy notes, such notes are exempted from authorization 
requirements for disclosure in order “to avert a serious and imminent threat 
to health or safety of a person or the public, which may include a serious 
and imminent threat to military personnel or members of the public or a 
serious or imminent threat to a specific military mission or national 
security.”54  For positions that require security clearances, evidence of 
mental health “issues” may derail the clearance process, jeopardizing an 
individual’s career opportunities within the service.  For example, U.S. 
Army regulations governing the process for obtaining security clearances 
consistent trick of being able to make service members with problems disappear from the 
ranks of their services.”). 
50  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(k) (1)(i) (“Armed Forces personnel.  A covered entity may use 
and disclose the protected health information of individuals who are Armed Forces 
personnel for activities deemed necessary by appropriate military command authorities to 
assure the proper execution of the military mission.”).  See also Camilla Schwoebel & 
Roger Schlimbach, Confidentiality: A Conundrum in Veterans Behavioral Health Care, 32 
DEVELOPMENTS IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW 1, 1-2 (2013) (discussing both HIPAA and DoD 
regulations that implicate release of health information in military settings). 
51  See Department of Defense, Health Information Privacy Regulation, C7.11.1.1, at 69 
(DoD 6025.18-R) (January 2003): 
A covered entity (including a covered entity not part of or affiliated 
with the Department of Defense) may use and disclose the protected 
health information of individuals who are Armed Forces personnel for 
activities deemed necessary by appropriate military command 
authorities to assure the proper execution of the military mission. Id.
52  See id. C7.11.1.3.1, at 70.  (“To determine the member's fitness for duty, including 
but not limited to the member's compliance with standards and all other activities…”).
53  See id. C7.11.1.3.2, at 70.  (“To determine the member's fitness to perform any 
particular mission, assignment, order, or duty, including compliance with any actions 
required as a precondition to performance of such mission, assignment, order, or 
duty."). 
54  Id. at C5.1.2.2.5. 
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state that, “[i]f information developed by the command indicates the 
existence, current or past, of any mental or nervous disorder or emotional 
instability, a request for a PSI will not be submitted and interim clearance 
will not be granted.”55  
An affirmative mandate for reporting incidents of child abuse in 
federal jurisdictions exists through the Victims of Child Abuse Act of 
1990, codified at 42 U.S.C. 13031.  The statute requires that persons 
engaged in covered professional capacities or activities on federally owned 
or operated property must report suspected child abuse to applicable 
authorities.56 The statute specifically requires reporting by physicians, 
health care practitioners, mental health professionals, social workers, 
counselors, alcohol/drug treatment professionals, and a variety of other 
professions.57  Chaplains or clergy are not, however, identified in the 
statute’s list of covered professionals, no military cases and only 
one federal case—Zimmerman vs. U.S.—has explored the issue of 
whether military chaplains are covered in the statute’s reporting 
requirements, but reached no direct conclusion.58  The statute does 
however, specifically 
55 Army Regulation 380-67: Security: Personnel Security Program, at 5-8 (Ground for 
denial). 
56  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13031(a)-(h):  
A person who, while engaged in a professional capacity or activity 
described in subsection (b) of this section on Federal land or in a 
federally operated (or contracted) facility, learns of facts that give 
reason to suspect that a child has suffered an incident of child abuse, 
shall as soon as possible make a report of the suspected abuse to the 
agency designated under subsection (d) of this section. 
Id. 
57  See id. at (b) Covered professionals (listing professionals mandated to report suspected 
child abuse). 
58  See Zimmerman v. U.S., 171 F.Supp.2d 281 (2001).  In, Zimmerman the plaintiff’s 
daughter had been sexually assaulted by a naval officer at West Point military academy, 
was caught, and subsequently sentenced to confinement and dismissal from the Navy.  The 
officer had previously engaged in behavior that suggested he was a sexual predator, and 
that information had been provided to a chaplain and other staff of a ministry program at 
the academy.  The chaplain and other staff had not warned authorities about the behavior, 
and plaintiff sued arguing that they breached their responsibility to report suspected child 
abuse under 42 U.S.C. 13031, allowing the officer to later assault his daughter.  See id.  at 
283-287.  The government argued that the chaplain staff was not covered under the statute
as they were clergy.  Without ruling on the substance of the issue, the court held that in
order for them to not be covered, they needed to be acting in their capacities as clergy.  See
id. at 298.  This suggests that clergy acting in their professionals as chaplains may not be
covered by the statute’s reporting requirements, but the court never specifically answered
that inquiry.
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require psychologists, psychiatrists, and other mental health professionals 
to report suspected child abuse.59 The 42 U.S.C. 13031 reporting 
requirements have been recognized and integrated into Department of 
Defense60 and Veterans Affairs61 regulations.  Additionally, DoD 
instructions such as Instruction 6400.01 and others recognize DoD policy 
to promote early identification and reporting of suspected child abuse, 
assessment and treatment of abusers, and establishment of reporting 
mechanisms.62 
Arguably, embedding mental health providers within active duty units 
might alleviate the stigma of mental health professionals and enhance trust 
within military culture.  However, the regulatory framework that allows 
personal health information to be provided to command is still a significant 
barrier to communication between Service members and mental health 
professionals.  It should be noted that the military has developed services 
that offer a degree of confidentiality and/or anonymity for Service 
members concerned with mental health issues, such as Military OneSource 
(www.militaryonesource.mil) and Military Pathways 
(www.militarymentalhealth.org).  However, communications are still 
subject to stated exceptions that mandate reporting in some instances.63 
The development of mechanisms for chaplains (who enjoy complete 
confidentiality) to work with mental health providers (whose 
communications are subject to significant exceptions) would aid in 
fulfilling the objectives of an integrated mental health strategy for military 
personnel.64   
59  42 U.S.C.A. § 13031(b)(2). 
60 See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION 6400.03 (Apr. 2014) 
(outlining instructions for Family Advocacy Command Assistance Team). 
61  See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VHA DIRECTIVE 2012-022 
(Sept. 2012) (outlining instructions for reporting cases of abuse and neglect). 
62 See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION 6400.01 (Feb. 2015) 
(outlining instructions regarding identification, reporting, and prevention of domestic and 
child abuse). 
63 See Frequently Asked Questions on Confidential Face-to-Face Non-medical Counseling, 
http://www.militaryonesource.mil/counseling?content_id=267023 (stating “exceptions to 
confidentiality are legal and military requirements to report child abuse, spouse abuse, 
elder abuse, threats of harm to self or others and any present or future illegal activity”). 
64 See Barbara J. Zanotti & Rick A. Becker, Matching To The Beat of A Different Drummer: 
Is Military Law and Mental Health Out-of-Step after Jaffee v. Redmond?  41 AIR FORCE 
L. REV. 66-67 (1997) (discussing the case of an Airman who committed suicide and did
not seek help because of fear it would jeopardize his career, concern about confidentiality
with mental health problems, and preferences for services members to talk with chaplains
because of the privileged communications).
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III. Military Rule of Evidence 503: Privileged Communications and
Chaplaincy
The legal application of chaplain confidentiality is the concept of 
privileged communication.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines privileged 
communication as “[t]hose statements made by certain persons with a 
protected relationship such as husband-wife, attorney-client, priest-
penitent and the like which the law protects from forced disclosure on the 
witness stand at the option of the witness, client, penitent, spouse.”65  
Privileged communication is a long-standing legal device recognized in 
common law and Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.66 It was 
first cited in the United States in the case of People v. Phillips67, in which 
the court ruled that a priest could not be compelled to testify in court 
against an alleged thief before a grand jury.68  In 1828, New York enacted 
the first statute recognizing the privilege, stating that no minister could be 
forced to testify to the contents of a confession made to him.69 The 
functional basis of the privilege is that the social benefit of maintaining 
confidentiality between an individual and their religious minister 
outweighs the evidentiary value of that information presented in court.70  
By the early 1960s, almost all the states had developed a statute 
recognizing a clergy privilege.71 Generally speaking, these statutes 
65  HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed.) 832 (1991). 
66  FED. R. EVID. 501 (Privilege in General). 
67  People  v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813) (unpublished decision). 
68 See Shawn P. Bailey, How Secrets Are Kept: Viewing the Current Clergy-Penitent 
Privilege Through a Comparison with the Attorney-Client Privilege, 2002 BYU L. REV. 
489, 489-490 (2002) (describing the case of People v. Phillips, in which a catholic priest 
was protected from testifying in court against the defendant).  
69  See Jacob M. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 
23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 106 (1983) (discussing New York state legislation N.Y. Rev. 
Stat. § 72, pt. 3, ch. VII, art. 8 (1828)). 
70  See id. at 109-110 (“First, it is often stated that protecting the privacy of the conversation 
between minister and penitent is in the general interests of society.”); Lennard K. 
Whittaker, The Priest-Penitent Privilege: Its Constitutionality and Doctrine, 13 REGENTS
U. L. REV. 145, 160-161 (2000) (discussing the balancing of interests between compelled
testimony and preservation of confidentiality between a minister and penitent).  Whittaker
notes that there is a constitutional argument for maintaining the privilege as well: If the
contents of a confession were to be disclosed in a court of law, it would impede an
individual’s freedom of religious expression as he might be discouraged from confessing
sins or thoughts to a minister—an important part of a person’s religious activity.  Id.
71  See Jacob M. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege,
23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 107-108 (1983) (“From 1955 to 1963 fourteen more states
enacted minister’s privilege statutes.  Today forty-six states and the District of Columbia
have enacted such statutes.”)
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recognize the existence of a privilege in cases where an individual is 
seeking spiritual counsel with a member of the clergy while acting in his 
or her professional capacity.72  Since the creation of the privilege statutes, 
civil law courts have grappled with a number of issues, including the 
definition of who is considered a qualifying member of the clergy,73 
whether clergy were acting in their “official capacity” at the time they 
received communications,74 and other issues.  The privilege has been 
recognized by the Supreme Court, which stated in Trammel v. United 
States (1980)75: 
The privileges between priest and penitent, attorney and 
client, and physician and patient limit protection to 
private communications.  These privileges are rooted in 
the imperative need for confidence and trust.  The priest-
penitent privilege recognizes the human need to disclose 
to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, 
what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to 
receive priestly consolation and guidance in return.76 
This understanding of the intent of the clergy privilege was also 
reflected in the important case of United States v. Moreno (A.C.M.R.),77 
discussed infra,78 in which the Army Court of Military Review stated 
that: 
The privilege regarding communications with a 
clergyman reflects an accommodation between the 
public's right to evidence and the individual's need to be 
able to speak with a spiritual counselor, in absolute 
confidence, and disclose the wrongs done or evils 
thought and receive spiritual absolution, consolation, or 
guidance in return.79   
72  See R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is it (Past) Time for a Dangerous 
Person Exception to the Clergy-Penitent Privilege?  44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1627, 
1647 (2003) (discussing the majority trends in state clergy-penitent statues). 
73  See Yellin, supra note 69, at 114-121 (discussing cases defining covered clergyman).  
74 See id. at 121-126 (discussing cases examining the status and situation of 
clergymen while receiving communications from penitents). 
75  445 U.S. 40 (1980). 
76   Id. at 51. 
77  20 M.J. 623 (A.C.M.R. 1985). 
78  See infra notes 102-110 and accompanying discussion on the Moreno case. 
79  Moreno, 20 M.J. at 626 (A.C.M.R. 1985). 
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The compelling policy rationale for the clergy privilege in the military thus 
seems to be the protection of deeply personal communications about 
spiritual matters with chaplains.  This aligns with the primary historic role 
of chaplains in the military to facilitate the free expression of religion 
within the ranks.80  The clergy privilege is the legal mechanism which 
protects the confidentiality of servicemembers’ spiritual and religious 
communications as a manifestation of the free practice of religion.  
In recent years, however, the clergy privilege has been modified in the 
civilian world as a matter of social policy.  The most common situations 
in which clergy privileges do not apply are in cases of child abuse or other 
serious crimes.81 Criticism of the privilege has grown sharper with the 
revelation of child sexual abuse cover-ups within some Roman Catholic 
parishes.82 Many states thus currently maintain mandatory reporting 
statutes for child abuse which include members of the clergy.83 In such 
cases, the reporting exceptions abrogate the privilege.  The variation 
within state statutes, however, has prompted some to call for the adoption 
of uniform statutes to rectify conflicts between protecting victims of abuse 
with clergy confidentiality.84 
80  See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF supra note 11 at I-1 (“US military chaplains are a unique 
manifestation of the nation’s commitment to the values of freedom of conscience and free 
exercise of religion proclaimed in her founding documents.”). 
81  See id. at 1687-1699 (arguing for an exception to clergy-penitent statutes in cases where 
a parishioner notifies a member of the clergy about intent or activity of harm to another 
person); J. Michael Keel, Law and Religion Collide Again: The Priest-Penitent Privilege 
in Child Abuse Reporting Cases, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 681, 681 (1997-1998) (discussing 
disparities of treatment that might manifest due to the exercise of the clergy-penitent 
privilege). 
82  See generally Mary G. Frawley-O’Dea, The History and Consequences of the Sexual-
Abuse Crisis in the Catholic Church, 5 STUDIES IN GENDER AND SEXUALITY 11 (2004) 
(discussing the sexual abuse crisis in the Catholic church and its impact on survivors and 
the church); Christina Mancini & Ryan T. Shields, Notes on a (Sex Crime) Scandal: The 
Impact of Media Coverage of Sexual Abuse in the Catholic Church on Public Opinion, 42 
J. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 221 (2014) (discussing news media stories about the Catholic Church 
sex abuse scandals and public opinion about the church’s response); Thomas G. Plante & 
Courtney Daniels, The Sexual Abuse Crisis in the Roman Catholic Church: What 
Psychologists and Counselors Should Know, 52 PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY 381 (2004) 
(discussing the sexual abuse crisis in the Catholic church and stereotypical “myths” 
involved with the crisis). 
83  See Child Welfare Information Gateway, Clergy as Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse 
and Neglect (discussing the status of state laws on mandatory reporting and clergy), 
http://www.bishop-accountability.org/news2010/03_04/clergymandated.pdf 
84  See Norman Abrams, Addressing the Tension Between the Clergy-Communicant 
Privilege and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in State Statutes, 44 B.C.L. REV. 1127 (2003) 
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The creation of the Integrated Mental Health Strategy, and its 
recommendations for integrating chaplaincy more closely with military 
mental health, does present a new context in which to consider the clergy 
privilege, and its policy rationale.  However, the military rule itself has 
remained relatively static since its creation, and maintains no exceptions. 
The heart of the privileged communication rule within the armed services 
is Military Rule of Evidence 503, Communications to clergy.85 In its 
entirety, the rule states:  
Rule 503.  Communications to clergy 
(a) General rule of privilege 
A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent another from disclosing a confidential 
communication by the person to a clergyman or to a 
clergyman's assistant, if such communication is made 
either as a formal act of religion or as a matter of 
conscience. 
(b) Definitions 
As used in this rule: 
(1) A “clergyman” is a minister, priest, rabbi, chaplain, or 
other similar functionary of a religious organization, or an 
individual reasonably believed to be so by the person 
consulting the clergyman. 
(2) A “clergyman's assistant” is a person employed by or 
assigned to assist a clergyman in his capacity as a spiritual 
advisor. 
(3) A communication is “confidential” if made to a 
clergyman in the clergyman's capacity as a spiritual 
adviser or to a clergyman's assistant in the assistant's 
official capacity and is not intended to be disclosed to 
third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in 
furtherance of the purpose of the communication or to 
those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the 
communication. 
(discussing the problem of conflict of societal interests and proposing uniform state laws 
that rectify reporting with exercise of religion). 
85  MCM, supra note 24, MIL. R. EVID. 503. 
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(c) Who may claim the privilege 
The privilege may be claimed by the person, by the 
guardian, or conservator, or by a personal representative 
if the person is deceased.  The clergyman or clergyman's 
assistant who received the communication may claim the 
privilege on behalf of the person.  The authority of the 
clergyman or clergyman's assistant to do so is presumed 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
 
The critical components of the rule are (1) identification of the speaker 
as the holder of the privilege; (2) requirement that the communication be 
made as an act of religion or matter of conscience; and (3) requirement 
that the clergyman be acting in a capacity as a “spiritual advisor”.  If those 
conditions are met, the communication cannot be revealed in courts-
martial against a defendant.86 The party asserting the privilege—the one 
attempting to stop the introduction of information in a court (usually the 
defendant)—has the burden of showing the communication is privileged 
by a preponderance of the available evidence.87  The few cases that have 
examined the clergy privilege typically involve defendants’ counsels 
requesting suppression of evidence in appellate cases.  Whether the 
privilege applies is a mixed question of fact and law.88  
 
It should be noted that communications to clergy is one of several 
forms of privileged communication that were specifically identified in 
                                                          
86  See MIL. R. EVID. 1101 (discussing applicability of the rules of evidence and stating that 
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Manual, these rules apply generally to all courts-
martial, including summary courts-martial….”).  It should be noted that the version of this 
rule in the Military Commission Rules of Evidence is significantly different, as it carves 
out a wide exception for communications about future commissions or a crime, or 
concealment of a past crime.  See MIL. C’MMN. R. EVID. 503(D).  The military commission 
rules – applicable to aliens in military commissions – thus contemplate situations in which 
clergy are made aware of information about potential terrorist strikes or plans.  This would 
be the case for example of a U.S. service clergyman counseling a foreign national prisoner 
in Guantanamo Bay.  For a discussion of this hypothetical, see Jonathan G. Odom, Beyond 
Arm Bands and Arms Banned: Chaplains, Armed Conflict, and the Law, 49 NAVAL L. REV. 
1, 62-63 (2002) (discussing interview with a U.S. military chaplain who counsels detainees 
at Guantanamo Bay). 
87  See U.S. v. McCollum, 58 M.J. 323 (2003) (discussing the framework for application of 
communication privileges). 
88  See U.S. v. Coleman, 26 M.J. 407, 409 (1988) (“The question of whether a privilege 
exists is a mixed question of law and fact.”); U.S. v. Isham, 48 M.J. 603, 605 (1998) (“The 
question of whether a privilege applies to a conversation ‘is a mixed question of law and 
fact.’”); U.S. v. Shelton, 64 M.J. 32, 37 (2006) (“Whether a communication is privileged is 
a mixed question of fact and law.”). 
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section V of the Military Rules of Evidence.  Thus, unlike the Federal 
Rules of Evidence (FRE), which contain no individual privileges and defer 
to the courts to recognize such, the MRE codify specific privileged 
communications.89  The specification of privileges within the MRE was a 
significant departure from the FRE, which served as the general 
foundation for the military rules.  When the MRE were created, the 
drafting committee sought to align the MRE with the FRE where possible, 
in order to create symmetry between the military and federal laws.90  The 
codification of individual privileges within the MRE, however, reflected a 
desire to minimize uncertainty and promote uniformity in the military 
environment and courts-martial.91  The new privileges in the MRE were 
derived from the Manual for Courts-Martial, and commentary on proposed 
privileges from the FRE adapted to this military environment.92  MRE 501 
outlines general rules for privileges, stating that no other claims of 
privilege exist beyond those listed therein, unless required or provided by 
the Constitution,93 an Act of Congress,94 or common law principles of the 
federal courts.95  It should be noted that rule 501 specifically bars a 
privilege on communications to medical officers or civilian physicians.96 
As noted in the official commentary of the Military Rules of Evidence, 
this is because “such a privilege was considered to be totally incompatible 
with the clear interest of the armed forces in ensuring the health and fitness 
for duty of personnel.”97  
89 See FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that the interpretation of common law by the federal courts 
governs claims of privilege). 
90 See Fredric I. Lederer, The Military Rules of Evidence: Origins and Judicial 
Implementation, 130 MIL. L. REV. 5, 12-13 (1990) (describing the intention of the MRE 
drafting work group to base the MRE on the FRE to the extent possible, with necessary 
modifications to the military context).  
91  See Major David L. Hayden, Should There Be A Psychotherapist Privilege in Military 
Courts-Martial? 123 MIL. L. REV. 31, 70 (1989) (noting the intention of the MRE drafters 
to provide simple, clear rules to privileges in order to fit the military environment). 
92 See Lederer, supra note 81, at 26-27 (discussing codification of the individual privileges 
in the MRE). 
93  See MIL. R. EVID. 501(a)(1) (stating that no privilege exists unless required by “[t]he 
Constitution of the United States as applied to members of the armed forces”). 
94  See MIL. R. EVID. 501(a)(2) (stating that no privilege exists unless required by “[a]n act 
of Congress applicable to trials by courts-martial”). 
95  See MIL. R. EVID. 501(a)(4) (stating that no privilege exists unless required by 
“principles of common law generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United 
States district courts pursuant to rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence”). 
96  See MIL. R. EVID. 501(d): “Notwithstanding any other provision of these rules, 
information not otherwise privileged does not become privileged on the basis that it was 
acquired by a medical officer or civilian physician in a professional capacity.” 
97  See MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL UNITED STATES A22-39 (2012). 
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A. The seminal cases: Moreno, Beattie, Isham, and Shelton
Only a handful of cases that significantly implicate Rule 503 have 
come before the military courts.  The seminal case is United States v. 
Moreno (A.C.M.R. 1985),98  in which the Army Court of Military Review 
reviewed the major criteria for the privilege to apply.  The holding in 
Moreno would thus serve as a major precedent for subsequent cases 
analyzing the basic requirements for application of Rule 503.  Although 
the courts have yet to deal with a case involving the flow of 
communications among or between chaplains and psychotherapists in a 
mental health treatment setting, there are also two important cases that are 
relevant to referral of servicemembers to other help-providing entities 
within the service environment: United States v. Beattie (A.F.C.M.R. 
1987),99 and United States v. Isham (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1998).100 
Additionally, United States v. Shelton (C.A.A.F. 2006)101 provides further 
guidance on the Moreno requirements, and discussion on the intent of the 
communicator as a component of the Rule 503 privilege.  
In United States v. Moreno (A.C.M.R. 1985),102 the defendant Moreno 
intentionally shot and killed another soldier he was having an affair with 
in the barracks.  Immediately after the killing, and before he had been 
caught, Moreno went to a chapel on base to speak to an Army chaplain. 
According to the chaplain, Moreno was extremely emotional and upset 
and said, “I’ve sinned.  I’ve hurt somebody real bad,” and confessed to the 
shooting.103 The chaplain called the barracks, learned that the killing had 
occurred, and then told Moreno he would have to contact the police. 
Moreno apparently consented to that action.  The chaplain subsequently 
contacted the military police, who came and arrested Moreno.  Moreno 
opted to remain silent after being taken into custody as per his Article 31 
rights of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which states that no person 
may be interrogated without being notified of his right to remain silent to 
not incriminate oneself.104  The trial judge allowed the chaplain’s 
98  20 M.J. 623 (A.C.M.R. 1985). 
99  1987 CMR LEXIS 622 (A.F.C.M.R. Aug. 7, 1987). 
100  48 M.J. 603 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1998). 
101  64 M.J. 32 (C.A.A.F. 2006). 
102  20 M.J. 623 (A.C.M.R. 1985). 
103  See id. at 624-625 (outlining the facts to the case and the encounter between 
Moreno and the chaplain after the shooting.)  
104  See 10 U.S.C.A. § 831. Art. 31. Compulsory self-incrimination prohibited.  The 
article states that:  
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testimony about the event at court, considering Moreno’s actions as a 
confession to a crime, and not a spiritual discussion.105 He was 
subsequently convicted of murder by the trial court. 
On appeal, Moreno argued that the chaplain’s testimony should have 
been privileged under Rule 503 and not introduced in court.  The Army 
Court of Military Review identified three criteria for the rule to apply:  
(1) The communication must be made either as a formal
act of religion or as a matter of conscience; (2) it must be
made to a clergyman in his capacity as a spiritual advisor
or to his assistant in his official capacity; and (3) the
communication must be intended to be confidential.106
The court then found that the first two conditions were met, because 
Moreno was 1) clearly wanting to communicate about a spiritual issue 
(“I’ve sinned”), and 2) the Army chaplain was clearly a clergyman on duty 
acting in his official role as a spiritual advisor.107  As to the third condition, 
the court noted that the chaplain believed that the primary purpose of 
(a) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to
incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to which may
tend to incriminate him.
(b) No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any
statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without
first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him
that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of
which he is accused or suspected and that any statement made by him
may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.
(c) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make
a statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the
statement or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to
degrade him.
(d) No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article,
or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful
inducement may be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-
martial.
Id.  
105  See U.S. v. Moreno, 20 M.J. 623, 626 (A.C.M.R. 1985) (discussing the trial court’s 
consideration of the facts of the case and disagreeing with them). 
106  Id. at 626. 
107  See id. (“Chaplain George testified that, among the reasons he thought appellant came 
to him, was because appellant had a conscience and knew the chaplain to be a man of God. 
That testimony, plus appellant's opening remark to George, “I have sinned,” satisfy the first 
two criteria.”). 
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Moreno’s visit was to confess to the crime through the chaplain.  However, 
the court observed that Moreno himself could have easily turned himself 
in without even seeing a chaplain, and from Moreno’s standpoint, the 
primary purpose of this communication was to seek spiritual counsel for 
his actions.  The court thus held that, “As we read Mil. R. Evid. 503, 
appellant’s intent is controlling, not [the chaplain’s] impression of it.”108 
Because Moreno intended for the conversation to be confidential, it thus 
met all the requirements of Rule 503, and thus the chaplain’s testimony 
should not have been admitted to the trial court.109 The Moreno holding 
suggests that a necessary requirement of the Rule 503 test—that the 
communication is intended to be confidential—is interpreted in favor of 
the speaker, and should not be presumed to be meant as a confession 
to command beyond the chaplain.  An additional by-product of the 
Moreno decision was its structuring of the Rule 503 requirements into 
a three-pronged test, which would be cited in subsequent cases 
by courts examining the clergy-penitent privilege.110     
United States v. Beattie111 (A.F.C.M.R. 1987) involved a question of 
whether advising a service member to report himself for a crime was a 
violation of Rule 503.  In Beattie, the defendant airman went to a U.S. Air 
Force base chapel to seek advice from a chaplain.  Beattie met the 
chaplain, and told him he wanted to turn himself in and seek help for child 
sexual abuse.  The chaplain believed that Beattie was basically asking for 
a referral, and the chaplain thus suggested he go to the family advocacy 
office to talk to a commander, but did not direct or order him to go.  The 
defendant went there, where the commander told him to go to the military 
police.  Beattie went to the police, and confessed to sexually abusing his 
children.  His statements were introduced at the trial court, and he 
subsequently pled guilty to sexual abuse.112  
On appeal, Beattie argued that the chaplain’s referral amounted to a 
violation of Rule 503.  The Air Force Court of Military Review disagreed, 
108  Id. 
109  Id. (“Instead, we believe appellant's intent that the communication be confidential is 
adequately revealed by his initial purpose for speaking with George and by his later refusal 
to make a statement to investigators after being apprehended.  We conclude the military 
judge committed error in allowing Chaplain George to testify over appellant's objection.”).  
110  See infra notes 114-136 and accompanying discussion on U.S. v. Isham, 48 M.J. 603 
(1998) and U.S. v. Shelton, 64 M.J. 32 (2006), two recent Rule 503 cases which made use 
of the three part Moreno test. 
111  1987 CMR LEXIS 622 (A.F.C.M.R. Aug. 7, 1987). 
112  See id. at 1-3 (outlining background to the case). 
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and held that “[t]he privilege provided for under Rule 503 is against the 
disclosure of a confidential communication, not giving advice when it is 
requested.”113  Therefore, there was no violation of Rule 503, and Beattie’s 
conviction was affirmed.  Beattie thus stands for the important holding that 
a chaplain—upon being told of a troubling, illegal action—can refer the 
speaker to another entity, and even inform them that their actions are 
illegal, and such a referral would not be considered a privileged 
communication.  In this sense, the holding in Beattie supports what is a 
critically important role for military chaplains—to refer troubled 
servicemembers to other entities or available resources, but without 
coercing the servicemember, or violating confidentiality.  
United States v. Isham114 revisited some of the same concerns 
involving referral, and spoke to the extent confidential communications to 
clergy can be shared with others and still be privileged under Rule 503.  In 
Isham, the defendant was a Marine experiencing anxiety and depression, 
and went to seek help from the unit chaplain.  During a private meeting, 
Isham told the chaplain he had thoughts of shooting other people and then 
killing himself.115 The chaplain stopped Isham, and told him he would 
have to break confidentiality and tell others of his thoughts.  The 
chaplain’s testimony was later provided in the court-martial in which 
Isham was convicted of communicating a threat.116  
On appeal to the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, 
Isham argued that the military trial judge had erred by allowing the 
chaplain to testify against him.  The court agreed with Isham.  First, the 
court held that the controlling rule in the case was the three-prong test 
established in Moreno: whether the communication was an act of religion 
or conscience, whether the chaplain was acting in official capacity as a 
spiritual advisor, and whether the communication was intended to be 
confidential.117  The court found that the first two conditions were met 
113  Id. at 4. 
114  48 M.J. 603 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1998).  
115  See id. at 604-607 (discussing the conversation between Isham and the chaplain). 
116  See id. (same). 
117  See id. at 605 citing Moreno discussed supra: 
In Moreno, 20 M.J. at 626, our Army brethren listed three criteria for 
the privilege on communications to clergy to apply: '(1) the 
communication must be made either as a formal act of religion or as a 
matter of conscience; (2) it must be made to a clergyman in his 
capacity as a spiritual advisor...; and (3) the communication 
must be intended to be confidential.’
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because Isham had sought out the chaplain, and met with him “in the 
chaplain's office, while he was wearing the cross on his collar, and 
discussed matters of conscience with obvious religious overtones.”118  The 
third prong, however, was at issue.  The chaplain had explained to Isham 
that he would inform others about the situation only to the specific and 
limited extent that it could prevent Isham from carrying out his thoughts 
of shooting others, and “[t]he appellant agreed to this further disclosure 
for the limited purpose of getting help and preventing him from carrying 
out his threats.”119  In other words, Isham had agreed that information 
would be disclosed only to the extent for him to get necessary help, but 
believed that he would continue to serve as a Marine and not be court-
martialed.  In Isham’s words:  “I wanted to keep it confidential.  That way, 
nothing would affect me in the battalion.  I could get help for my problems 
and without making everybody look at me as a bad Marine."120 Isham 
believed that his communication would thus still be protected under Rule 
503.121 However, the chaplain’s testimony at Isham’s court-martial was a 
clear breach of privileged communication.  The appellate court stated: 
The appellant properly expected that he would be able to 
meet with a mental-health professional and that his unit 
would bar him from having access to any weapons.  He 
no doubt anticipated that reassignment or administrative 
separation would be forthcoming.  However, the chaplain 
did not go on to explain that he would have to testify 
against the appellant at a court-martial. 
Thus, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that 
the trial court had erred by allowing the chaplain to testify, and the 
conviction and sentence were removed.122 Importantly, the Isham decision 
established a key holding: chaplains may relay information from a penitent 
to others for the limited and specific purpose of addressing the penitent’s 
Id. 
118  Id.  
119  Id. at 606. 
120  48 M.J. 603, 604 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1998). 
121  See id. at 606 (“The appellant agreed to this further disclosure for the limited purpose 
of getting help and preventing him from carrying out his threats.  Therefore, his statements 
fell directly within the expansive definition of a “confidential communication” under 
Military Rule of Evidence 503(b)(2).”). 
122  See id. at 608 (“We hold, therefore, that the provisions of Military Rule of Evidence 
503 applied such as to bar the communications the appellant made to the chaplain from 
coming into evidence against him.”). 
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immediate situation.  In this case, the Isham court believed that the 
immediate situation permitted the chaplain to relay enough information to 
prevent Isham from harming himself or others, and no more.  The Isham 
holding thus suggests that the chaplain could and should have had mental 
health professionals or command remove his weapon and monitor him, so 
long as the reason for doing so was not relayed to others.  Doing so 
preserves the multiple interests of maintaining confidentiality with 
chaplains, and preventing impending violence.  
United States v. Shelton123 involved another situation 
concerning admission of child abuse.  In Shelton, an army soldier 
had sexually abused his daughter.  The daughter had told her mother 
(Shelton’s wife) about the abuse, and the mother then 
confronted Shelton but he refused to acknowledge the matter.  She 
then went to seek help from the civilian chaplain at the church she and 
Shelton attended.  Shelton and his wife had been receiving marriage 
counseling from this chaplain for some time on other issues.  She told 
the chaplain about the alleged abuse, and he agreed to talk to Shelton 
about it.124  Shelton went to the church and met the chaplain and the 
chaplain’s assistant, where they prayed together and then talked.  
During the discussion, the chaplain said, “Your wife told me something 
and I want to know if you did it because it's serious and you can go to 
jail for it  . . . you claim to be a Christian, Christians don't tell lies, 
and so I need to know.”125  Shelton then admitted to sexually abusing 
his daughter.  The chaplain told him he should bring his wife back to 
the church, and he immediately did so.  Once she was there, Shelton 
told his wife, “I did it.  I did it.  I'm wrong.  I did it.”126  The chaplain then 
told both the defendant and his wife that Washington state law 
required him to report the abuse.  Weeks later, the chaplain advised 
the wife that she should report her husband or he would do so.  She 
went to the military police, who conducted an investigation that led to 
Shelton’s admission of abuse.  He later told both a social worker and 
psychotherapist about the abuse as well.  The chaplain’s testimony, 
among others, was introduced into trial against Shelton, and he was 
subsequently convicted.127 
On appeal, Shelton argued that his communications to the chaplain 
were privileged, and thus wrongly used against him in the court-martial.  
123  64 M.J. 32 (C.A.A.F. 2006). 
124  See id. at 34-35 (discussing factual circumstances of the case). 
125  Id. at 34. 
126  Id. at 35. 
127  See id. at 34-35 (discussing factual circumstances of the case leading to Shelton’s 
eventual confession of abuse to the military investigators). 
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The appellate court first examined whether the three-part test in Moreno 
was satisfied.  It held that the discussion between Shelton and the chaplain 
qualified as a “matter of conscience” because of its heavy religious 
overtones.  Specifically, they had prayed together prior to their discussion, 
and the chaplain had admonished him that, “You claim to be a Christian, 
Christians don't tell lies, so I need to know.”128 Even though the chaplain 
had previously counseled Shelton and his wife on secular matters, that did 
not preclude the possibility that their subsequent conversation was a 
religious one: 
These circumstances burdened Appellant's conscience, 
and following the advice of his pastor, Rev. Dennis, 
Appellant confessed.  We note that the past secular 
discussion between Appellant and Rev. Dennis related to 
financing, budgeting, and family matters.  But there is 
nothing in the record to establish that these counseling 
sessions were as spiritually charged as the counseling 
involved in the present case.  The mere prior counseling 
contact between Rev. Dennis and Appellant on other 
matters does not preclude a conclusion that, in the present 
instance, Appellant's communication with Rev. Dennis 
was a matter of conscience.129 
For these same reasons, the court also concluded that the second 
prong of the test was met—the communication was made to a 
clergyman in his capacity as a spiritual advisor.130 Finally, there was the 
question of whether Shelton intended the communication to be 
confidential, which required that the “[c]ourt focuses on Appellant to 
make this determination.”131 Even though the defendant’s wife was 
present in the second conversation, there was, from Shelton’s 
perspective, a “reasonable expectation that the counseling was 
indeed confidential.”132 This was because the “wife’s presence was  
128 See 64 M.J. at 38 (citing testimony from the trial court to show that the discussion 
between the chaplain and Shelton had clear religious overtones that qualified the 
discussion as one of a "matter of conscience").
129  Id. 
130 See id. (“Again, we consider the circumstances of Rev. Dennis beginning the 
meeting with prayer, the fact that the counseling session occurred at the church, and the 
religious atmosphere and spiritual language of the meeting as critical facts establishing 
that Appellant's communication with Rev. Dennis was in the clergy's official 
capacity.”).  
131  Id. 
132  Id. at 39. 
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necessary for his redemption”133 and she thus fell under the meaning of 
those whom “disclosure is in furtherance of the purpose of the 
communication” under 503(b)(3).  In support of this holding, the 
appellate court cited the Third Circuit decision of In re Grand Jury 
Investigation,134 which held that the presence of a third party in a family 
counseling session did not preclude the existence of a clergy-penitent 
privilege.135  The appellate court thus concluded that Shelton’s 
communication was privileged and should not have been introduced in 
court.136 
B. Determining who is a qualified chaplain under Rule 503: Kidd,
Coleman, Napolean, and Garries
The military courts have examined cases involving the question of 
who qualifies as a chaplain covered by the Rule 503 privilege.  This 
question is a pertinent one and deserving of judicial review, particularly 
with military chaplains potentially serving in multiple roles and settings 
while interacting with servicemembers.  However, the military cases 
which have examined this issue have been based on very narrow factual 
bases.  
A very early pre-Moreno case was United States vs. Kidd (A.F.B.R. 
1955),137 in which the Air Force Board of Review examined the 
circumstances following an airman’s desertion from Andrews Air Force 
Base.  Defendant Kidd left the base without permission for several months. 
Kidd was tried before a Staff Judge Advocate and convicted of desertion. 
Prior to sentencing, the Staff Judge Advocate considered the opinion of a 
chaplain who was a staff member at the confinement facility that held 
Kidd.  The chaplain had interviewed Kidd and concluded he was not suited 
to be in the Air Force, and should therefore be removed.138 Kidd argued 
that the Staff Judge Advocate should not have heard the chaplain’s opinion 
133   64 M.J. at 39.
134  918 F.2d 374 (1990). 
135  Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374(1990): “[a]s is the case 
with the attorney-client privilege, the presence of third parties, [which is] essential to 
and in furtherance of the communication, does not vitiate the clergy-communicant 
privilege.”). 
136  See 64 M.J. at 39 (“Because M.R.E. 503 grants Appellant a right to keep this 
privileged conversation confidential, we conclude that the military judge abused his 
discretion by ruling that Appellant's statements to his pastor were not privileged and would 
be otherwise admissible evidence."). 
137  20 CMR 713 (A.F.B.R. 1955).  
138   See id. at 719 (discussing the circumstances in which the chaplain interviewed the 
defendant and recommended his severance from service). 
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because it was privileged communication.  The court considered the fact 
that: 
[A]n Air Force Chaplain assigned to a confinement
facility as an additional duty occupies a dual role.  On the
one hand he is a staff officer whose function is to aid in
the retraining and rehabilitation of the prisoners and to
advise the commander in matters concerning prisoner
policy . . . On the other hand, he acts as clergyman for
those prisoners who profess his faith or who desire his
spiritual services.  Whether a chaplain acts in his secular
or spiritual role may vary from time to time depending
upon the circumstances involved.139
The Air Force Board of Review held that there was no affirmative 
showing that the information gathered by the chaplain was done so in his 
official capacity as a clergyman, nor was it clear if the nature of the 
chaplain’s conversation with Kidd was about religious or spiritual matters. 
Rather, the board simply noted that it was possible that the information 
about Kidd was gathered from the chaplain in his non-clergy capacity.  
Thus, “absent clear evidence” of that fact, the “presumptions operate in 
his [the chaplain’s] favor rather than the reverse” and the board therefore 
ruled that there was no privileged communication in this case.140  Thus, 
the Kidd case suggests that for chaplains who have dual roles as clergy and 
non-clergy staff, unless there is clear evidence that the chaplain heard 
information while acting in his capacity as a clergyman, then it is 
presumed that he was acting as non-clergy.  
Because of the lack of factual information presented in Kidd, the fact 
that it was adjudicated decades before Moreno, and has not yet been 
revisited to any significant extent by subsequent courts, it is unclear what 
value Kidd has to the question of chaplains having dual roles in 
professional settings.  Clearly, Kidd does touch on the important issue of 
where Rule 503 ends for clergy serving in professional settings in non-
chaplain roles, and seemingly demarcates those limits based on whether 
the chaplain is serving as a clergyman or a non-clergyman.  Subsequent 
cases exploring this issue, however, offer little guidance in this area 
because of the limited factual scenarios presented.       
139  Id. 
140  Id. 
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In United States v. Coleman (C.M.A. 1988),141 the Court of Military 
Appeals focused on the questions of whether a communication was made 
to a clergyman “in the clergyman’s capacity as a spiritual adviser.”142  In 
Coleman, the defendant Coleman had sexually abused his daughter.  The 
daughter had told her mother (Coleman’s wife) about the abuse, and both 
the daughter and mother testified against Coleman in a court-martial. 
The wife had also informed her father—a church reverend—about the 
sexual abuse.143 The reverend had also received a call from Coleman, and 
testified in the court-martial to the following: 
I received a phone call from Sergeant Coleman, and . . . 
he said to me . . . Dad, can you help me, my marriage is 
falling apart, and knowing what I had known—my 
daughter had come from Michigan . . . and she had told 
me about the alleged incident, and . . . I was upset and I'm 
sure that . . . [appellant] was upset . . . the whole family 
was upset, and I said, “Son, is there any wonder that your 
marriage is falling apart? Is it true that you took liberties 
with your daughter?”  And that, basically was the end of 
that conversation, and he said, “to pray for me” and I said, 
“I will,” and that's basically what was said.144 
The lower court had admitted the reverend’s testimony over Coleman’s 
objection that it be suppressed under Rule 503.  The court’s reasoning was 
that Rule 503 did not apply.  Although they held that the reverend was a 
chaplain, the communication itself was not considered a formal act of 
religion or a matter of conscience, and it was not communicated to a 
chaplain in an official capacity as a spiritual advisor.145  That was 
evidenced by the fact that the defendant had referred to the reverend as 
“dad” several times.146 Additionally, Coleman had argued that the 
admission of the testimony was information that materially prejudiced the 
court against him.  However, the appellate court noted that there was 
overwhelming evidence from the daughter which indicated his guilt, and 
141  26 M.J. 407 (C.M.A. 1988). 
142  MIL. R. EVID. 503(b). 
143  See Coleman, 26 M.J. at 407-408 (discussing the factual background of the case).  
144  Id. at 408. 
145  See id. at 409 (discussing the trial court’s reasoning). 
146  See id. (“I find that the accused did not perceive the communications to have been made 
to the clergyman in his capacity as spiritual adviser, as evidenced by his repeated use of 
the term “Dad” throughout the conversation.”). 
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the father’s testimony added little or no additional prejudice.147 The 
appellate court also held that the communication was not intended to be 
confidential either.148 
The Court of Military Appeals affirmed the appellate court, stating 
that the communication neither amounted to an act of religion nor 
pertained to a matter of conscience.149 The Military Appeals court was 
silent on the other requirements of the rule.  The Coleman holding seems 
to indicate that the fact the reverend was the defendant’s father in law was 
a significant factor excluding the conversation from the privilege.  It is 
unclear exactly why the conversation itself was not considered a matter of 
conscience nor act of religion.  That conclusion could have arisen from the 
perception that the substance of the conversation did not rise to that level. 
Additionally, the fact that the conversation was deemed not intended to be 
confidential seems to have arisen from the fact that Coleman’s abuse was 
already known to both the reverend and Coleman’s wife.  The Coleman 
holding in totality seems to suggest that when a clergyman is also a family 
member, a discussion with that person cannot be privileged if the facts of 
the case suggests that person was communicated to primarily as a family 
member.      
The issue of defining clergy under Rule 503 when another personal 
relationship existed was revisited in United States v. Napolean (C.A.A.F. 
1997).150  In that case, Air Force member Napolean stabbed and killed 
another person.  She was subsequently confined in a holding facility. 
Napolean’s friend Sgt. Walters visited her in jail.  Walters testified at the 
court-martial that at the jail, Napolean had said that “she wasn’t angry or 
147  See id.: 
Competent evidence, independent of the communication, 
overwhelmingly established appellant's guilt of the offense as charged. 
The victim, appellant's daughter, using an anatomically correct doll, 
testified clearly, convincingly, and in detail about the indecent acts 
committed on her.  In addition, appellant's wife testified he admitted 
his misconduct to her when she confronted him about the allegation. 
Id.  
148  See Coleman, 26 M.J. at 409 (discussing holding of the case). 
149  Id. at 409: 
The threshold for claiming the privilege is that “such communication is made 
either as a formal act of religion or as a matter of conscience.”  Mil.R.Evid. 
503(a). As was found by both the military judge and the Court of Military 
Review, neither of these two elements is present in the record before us. 
150  46 M.J. 279 (C.A.A.F. 1997). 
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enraged or anything when the incident occurred.”151 Walters also testified 
that he visited her “as a friend”152 but that he prayed with her and was a 
lay minister at a base chapel.153  Napolean was convicted of pre-meditated 
murder, and she argued on appeal that her attorney had erred by allowing 
Walter’s testimony at trial.  She asserted that without his testimony, her 
conviction would have been to a lesser charge of murder or 
manslaughter.154 Even though Napolean argued that she believed her 
communication to Walters was privileged under Rule 503,155 the appellate 
court held that she could not have “reasonably believed” he was a 
clergyman.156 In the court’s view, a lay minister did not rise to the status 
of a clergyman.157 Additionally, the communication itself fell short of 
being an act of religion or matter of conscience.  Rather, it was a 
communication of emotional support and not “guidance and 
forgiveness.”158 Interestingly, the court in Napolean also added the 
distinction that a “communication is not privileged, even if made to a 
clergyman, if it is made for emotional support and consolation rather than 
as a formal act of religion or as a matter of conscience”159 and that a 
satisfactory definition of the latter would be a communication reflecting 
“guidance and forgiveness.”160  This definition seems to suggest that the 
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces recognizes a clear distinction 
between communications made to clergy for purposes of emotional 
support, which would not be covered by the rule, and communications 
based in spiritual or religious concerns about forgiveness and guidance, 
which would be covered language.  Napolean is thus relevant in that sense 
as it can speak to the dual roles that pastoral chaplains may have in 
providing emotional support, or spiritual or religious guidance.  
151  Id. at 284. 
152  Id. at 283. 
153  See id. at 284 (quoting testimony from Sergeant Walters about his visits to Napolean). 
154 See id. (“Appellant argues that she was prejudiced by TSgt Walters' testimony because 
it was the only direct evidence of premeditation and without it, she probably would have  
been convicted only of unpremeditated murder or voluntary manslaughter.”). 
155 See 46 M.J. at 284 (describing the defendant’s arguments that she believed 
her communications with Walters were privileged).  
156  Id. at 285. 
157  See id. (noting that a lay minister is not a clergyman). 
158 See id. (“Finally, we hold that appellant has failed to show that her admissions to 
TSgt Walters were a ‘formal act of religion’ or were made ‘as a matter of 
conscience.’. . . The circumstances of TSgt Walters' visit, as described in the affidavits, 
suggest that appellant was seeking emotional support and consolation, not guidance and 
forgiveness.").
159  Id. 
160  46 M.J. at 285. 
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A final case in this line worth noting is the earlier decision of United 
States v Garries.161  In Garries, the defendant Garries allegedly murdered 
his wife in a premeditated fashion.  A significant amount of evidence 
and witness testimony pointed to Garries’ guilt, and an Air Force trial 
court convicted him of murder.162 The issue in the case involved the 
testimony of a church deacon and friend of Garries.  The deacon was a 
fellow Air Force member and Garries’ neighbor.  Both of them attended 
the same off-base church.  Prior to the murder, Garries had come to the 
deacon, and asked him where he could find the church pastor. The 
deacon said the pastor was out of town.  In private, Garries then made 
remarks to the deacon that he was upset with his wife and wanted to 
“bust her in the face.”163 The deacon testified that at that time, he was 
only a deacon and not a pastor certified to do pastoral counseling, and 
had only presented himself to the defendant as a friend, and not a 
religious figure. On appeal, Garries argued that the witness testimony 
from the church deacon was wrongfully introduced into court as it 
violated Rule 503.  The appellate court ruled against Garries on this 
matter.  They held that the deacon was not a clergyman, that the 
defendant did not at the time believe he was a clergyman, and therefore 
the discussion they had was not privileged communication under Rule 
503.164  Garries confirmed that the definition of a “clergyman” is a 
narrow one, and limited to those who provide spiritual or pastoral 
preaching, teaching, and counseling, and not administrative members of 
a religious organization such as a church deacon.  
C. Clergy communications and criminal investigation warning
requirements: Richards and Benner
Two MRE 503 cases have presented factual scenarios in which 
defendants have raised Uniform Code of Military Justice Article 31 
arguments.  Article 31 prohibits compulsory self-incrimination, and any 
violation of such renders subsequent communications inadmissible in 
trial.165 This scenario emerges when a servicemember communicates with 
a chaplain about a purported crime, and later raises as a defense the 
161  19 M.J. 845 (A.F.C.M.R. 1985). 
162  See id. at 848-852 (describing background of the case). 
163  Id. at 860. 
164  See id. at 860 (“First, we hold that Sgt. Hinton was not a person who could act as a 
clergyman.  Second, we find that the accused did not reasonably believe that Hinton was a 
clergyman.  Third, we find that the conversation between Hinton and the accused was not 
under circumstances amounting to a privileged communication.”). 
165 UCMJ art. 31 (2008). 
2017] Military Chaplains & Mental Health Professionals 321 
argument that the chaplain should have warned the speaker to his Article 
231 rights prior to making the communication.  An early case was United 
States v. Richards (N.M.C.M.R. 1984).166  In Richards, the defendant was 
a Navy clerk who had stolen funds from his ship.  Richards met with the 
ship chaplain to express his feelings of guilt and to seek advice about next 
steps.  The chaplain suggested that she meet with a legal officer to consult 
about the situation, without disclosing Richards’ identity, and Richards 
agreed.  At the meeting, the legal officer advised the chaplain that the 
defendant should voluntarily admit to the crime.  The chaplain 
communicated that advice to Richards, and he agreed to have the chaplain 
tell command about his crime.  He was subsequently convicted and 
sentenced by a court-martial.167  
On appeal to the Navy-Marine Court of Military Review, Richards 
argued that the chaplain should have read him his Article 31 rights 
prohibiting self-incrimination.168 He argued that because the chaplain had 
not read him those rights prior to their initial discussion, all the subsequent 
information revealed should have been inadmissible in a court-martial. 
The court, however, ruled against Richards, noting that Article 31 rights 
are only required when there is a “criminal investigatory purpose.”169 In 
this case, the initial conversation between the chaplain and Richards was 
a privileged communication covered under Rule 503 as an “a matter of 
conscience,” and not a criminal investigation.  Additionally, Richards’ 
subsequent confession to the crime through the chaplain was considered a 
waiver to the privilege under Rule 510 (Waiver of privilege by voluntary 
disclosure).170 His conviction was thus affirmed.  Richards thus holds that 
166  17 M.J. 1016 (N.M.C.M.R. 1984). 
167  See id. at 1017-1079 (discussing the factual background to the Richards case). 
168  See 10 U.S.C.A. § 831. Art. 31. Compulsory self-incrimination prohibited 
(discussed supra on Moreno case). 
169  See 17 M.J. 1016, 1019 (1984): 
In our judgment the considerations of concern to Congress in the 
enactment of Article 31, UCMJ, are not present in the instant case.  
There was no criminal investigatory purpose in the communication 
between the chaplain and appellant.  The only motivation was 
the conduct of a privileged conversation pursuant to MIL.R.EVID. 
503. Id.
170 See MIL. R. EVID. 510(a): 
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure 
of a confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the 
person or the person's predecessor while holder of the privilege 
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a discussion about issues of conscience with a clergyman resulting in 
information about criminal activity is not automatically an “investigation,” 
and such discussions do not require the reading of one’s rights against self-
incrimination.   
United States v. Benner (C.A.A.F. 2002)171 also implicated Article 31.  
In Benner, the defendant’s wife caught Benner sexually abusing their 
daughter.  The wife and daughter left Benner and urged him to seek help, 
but did not report him to authorities.172 Benner decided to seek counseling 
from an Army chaplain, and at their first meeting, he told the chaplain he 
had sexually abused his daughter.  The chaplain told Benner he would have 
to report this information to the military police.  The chaplain contacted 
the Army Family Advocacy office, where he was (erroneously) informed 
that he was required to report the abuse.  He then told Benner it would be 
best if he turned himself in, and would escort him to the military police. 
Benner was hesitant, but went with the chaplain.  Once there, he was 
notified of his Article 31 rights, and confessed to the police.  He was 
subsequently convicted of sodomy with a child.173    
On appeal, Benner argued that Rule 503 had been violated when the 
chaplain told him he was required to report the abuse.  The appellate court 
acknowledged that privileged communications with a clergyman are 
sealed, and that such communications do not require clergyman to warn 
penitents of Article 31 rights against self-incrimination or rights to an 
attorney.174  However, if a military officer happens to be a clergyman, but 
“acts on the premise that the penitent's disclosures are not privileged, then 
warnings are required.”175 The court held that because the chaplain had 
(erroneously) told Benner he had to report Benner’s actions, and 
encouraged him to turn himself in, it effectively tainted his confession. 
The appellate court ruled that Benner had come to the chaplain seeking 
voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part 
of the matter or communication under such circumstances that it would 
be inappropriate to allow the claim of privilege. Id. 
171   57 M.J. 210 (C.A.A.F. 2002). 
172   See id. at 211-212 (discussing factual background of Benner and his family). 
173 See id. (discussing factual background of Benner’s interaction with the chaplain 
and subsequent confession to the military police).  
174 See id. at 212 (“When a chaplain questions a penitent in a confidential and clerical 
capacity, the results may not be used in a court-martial because they are privileged.   
Therefore, the Article 31(b) and Tempia warnings are not required.”). 
175  Id. 
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confidential communications, but instead, the chaplain had acted not as a 
chaplain giving proper counseling, but as an ordinary officer.  Because he 
had not properly warned Benner of his rights, his resulting confession was 
invalid.176     
D. Synopsis of Rule 503 Cases
The evolved case law on Rule 503 has direct application for chaplains 
working in the field, and provides guidance on what to expect in the event 
of a legal case.  The Moreno case offers an important starting foundation. 
The military courts have consistently relied177 on the three-part test 
elucidated in Moreno that operationalizes Rule 503.178 Moreno is clear 
that if a Service member “confesses” as a matter of conscience or religion 
to a chaplain in his or her role as a spiritual advisor, that communication 
should be kept confidential and not shared with command.  If it is shared, 
the communication will be ruled inadmissible under Rule 503.  The 
Moreno case was reaffirmed in Benner where a military chaplain 
erroneously believed he had to report a Service member who had confided 
in him that he had abused children.179 However, both Benner and Moreno 
should be compared to the facts and holding in the Beattie case, where a 
chaplain advised a Service member who had committed child abuse to 
report himself to command, and the Service member voluntarily decided 
to do so.180  The Beattie case illustrates an example of a chaplain acting 
within his legal and ethical bounds in a proper fashion, whereas in Benner 
and Moreno the chaplains acted improperly.  In the very difficult situation 
when a chaplain is told information by a Service member in confidence 
that suggests he poses an actual, immediate threat to himself or others – 
such as suicide or murder – the chaplain should advise the person to seek 
help voluntarily.  In a dire situation involving immediate harm, Isham 
suggests that a chaplain can inform others to take necessary action to 
prevent that Service member from committing harmful activity (such as 
176  See 57 M.J. 210, 213-214 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (“Appellant was seeking clerical help. 
Instead of providing confidential counseling, the chaplain informed appellant that he was 
obliged to report appellant's action and thus, unknown to the chaplain, breach the 
“communications to clergy” privilege.  At this point, the chaplain was acting outside his 
responsibilities as a chaplain, and he was acting solely as an Army officer.  As such, he 
was required to provide an Article 31 warning before further questioning.”). 
177  See supra discussions at notes 114-22 and accompanying text on U.S. v. Isham, 48 M.J. 
603 (1998) and notes 123-36 and accompanying text on U.S. v. Shelton, 64 M.J. 32 (2006), 
two recent Rule 503 cases which made use of the three-part Moreno test. 
178  U.S. v. Moreno, 20 M.J. 623, 626 (1985). 
179  57 M.J. 210, 211-212 (2002) (discussing the facts of the case). 
180  See 1987 CMR LEXIS 622 at 1-3 (discussing facts in the Beattie case). 
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removing that person’s weapon or placing him under observation) but not 
the reason for doing so in order to preserve confidentiality.181    
The Moreno and Coleman rulings also indicate that the intention of 
the penitent has important implications for the applicability of Rule 503. 
Courts will examine whether communications are intended to be 
confidential from the perspective of the confessor, but as per Coleman will 
examine the totality of the factual background to determine whether the 
substance of the communication had already been known to others (and 
therefore not intended to be confidential),182 and if the person 
communicated to was a clergyman acting within his/her professional 
capacity as a spiritual advisor.  Coleman holds that if a person is primarily 
approached as a family member, Rule 503 does not apply.183 The Garries 
and Napolean cases support Coleman in holding that for a person to be a 
clergyman covered by Rule 503, he/she must be a professional clergyman 
responsible for religious preaching, teaching, and counseling, and the 
confessor must “reasonably believe” the person to be so.184  Rule 503 only 
applies to clergy or their assistants,185 and not to deacons or lesser 
administrative positions within a church,186 or to lay ministers.187 The Kidd 
case is also relevant, as many chaplains may serve in dual roles as a matter 
of official assignment.  In Kidd, a chaplain assigned to serve on a review 
board within a confinement facility was not considered a clergyman for 
purposes of Rule 503.188 Additionally, the Kidd court indicated that in such 
a situation, there must be “clear evidence” that the chaplain was serving in 
a role as a clergyman as a spiritual advisor in order for coverage to 
apply.189  This case law indicates that courts will permit a strict 
interpretation of Rule 503’s requirements for who constitutes a clergyman, 
181 48 M.J. 603, 606 (1998) (holding that in the specific facts of Isham, action could 
be taken for the limited purposes of getting help to a service member while preserving 
confidentiality).   
182  See Coleman, 26 M.J. at 409 (discussing confidentiality in the Coleman case). 
183  See id. (discussing facts and holding of the Coleman case). 
184 See 19 M.J. 845, 860 (1985) (discussing whether the church deacon was a 
clergyman, and deciding that he was not).  
185  MIL. R. EVID. 503(B)(1-2). 
186 See 19 M.J. 845, 860 (1985) (discussing whether the church deacon was a 
clergyman, and deciding that he was not).  
187  See 46 M.J. at 116 (holding that a lay minister is not a covered clergyman). 
188 See 20 CMR 713, 714-719 (1955) (discussing whether chaplain was acting in 
hiscapacity as a clergyman while serving at a confinement facility and holding that he 
was not at the time he had received information about a plaintiff).   
189  See id. at 719 (discussing the court’s consideration of the chaplain’s dual roles at 
the confinement facility in Kidd).  
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and in what circumstances.  Military chaplains should be cognizant of 
whether they are working in their professional capacities as spiritual or 
religious figures in their interactions with service members, and their 
assignments, circumstances, and individual relationships all factor into a 
determination of whether they are covered by Rule 503.  
IV. Military Rule of Evidence 513: Privileged Communications and
Psychotherapists
The military psychotherapist-patient privilege was created by an 
executive order from President Clinton in November of 1999.190 The 
privilege is codified as Rule 513 of the Military Rules of Evidence.  It 
creates a privilege on the part of a patient to prevent disclosure of 
confidential communications with psychotherapists in military courts.191 
As defined by the rule, a “psychotherapist” includes psychiatrists, clinical 
psychologists, clinical social workers, or other mental health 
professionals, who are licensed to provide such services, and their 
assistants, or people reasonably believed by a patient to have those 
credentials.192  “Confidential” communications include those that are not 
190  See 64 FR 55155 (1999) §2 (amending the Manual for Courts-Martial by Executive 
Order No. 13140 to include a psychotherapist-patient privilege). 
191  See MIL. R. EVID. 513(a):  
A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other 
person from disclosing a confidential communication made between 
the patient and a psychotherapist or an assistant to the psychotherapist, 
in a case arising under the UCMJ, if such communication was made 
for the purpose of facilitating diagnosis or treatment of the 
patient's mental or emotional condition. Id. 
192  See MIL. R. EVID. 513(b)(2): 
A “psychotherapist” is a psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, or clinical 
social worker who is licensed in any state, territory, possession, the 
District of Columbia or Puerto Rico to perform professional services 
as such, or who holds credentials to provide such services from any 
military health care facility, or is a person reasonably believed by the 
patient to have such license or credentials. Id.
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intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those necessary for 
transmission of the communication.193 
The establishment of the privilege came after the federal courts 
recognized its existence in the 1996 case of Jaffee v. Redmond.194 In Jaffee, 
the Supreme Court identified the social policy rationale for creating the 
federal psychotherapist privilege: 
Effective psychotherapy . . . depends upon an atmosphere 
of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to 
make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, 
memories, and fears.  Because of the sensitive nature of 
the problems for which individuals consult 
psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential 
communications made during counseling sessions 
may cause embarrassment or disgrace . . . 
The psychotherapist privilege serves the public interest 
by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for 
individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional 
problem.195   
Prior to Jaffee, the military courts had affirmatively rejected the notion 
that this privilege existed within the military, largely because the 
Military Rules of Evidence expressly barred—and still bars—a 
physician/doctor-patient privilege.196  Following the lead of the federal 
courts, the military psychotherapist privilege was also created in 
recognition of the benefits of 
193 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(b)(4): A communication is “confidential” if not intended to 
be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of 
the rendition of professional services to the patient or those reasonably necessary for 
such transmission of the communication.  Id.  
194  518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
195  Id. at 8-9. 
196 See MIL. R. EVID. 501(d): “Notwithstanding any other provision of these rules, 
information not otherwise privileged does not become privileged on the basis that it was 
acquired by a medical officer or civilian physician in a professional capacity.”  See also 
Stacy E. Flippin, Military Rule of Evidence (MRE) 513: A Shield To Protect 
Communications of Victims and Witnesses to Psychotherapists, ARMY LAWYER 1, 
2-7 (Sept. 2003) (outlining the development of the privilege in federal law and military
cases ruling against it prior to 1999); Barbara J. Zanotti & Rick A. Becker, Marching to
the Beat of a Different Drummer: Is Military Law and Mental Health Out-of-Step after
Jaffee v. Redmond? 41 A.F. L. REV. 1, 1-25 (1997) (discussing the Jaffee ruling by the
Supreme Court and historical treatment of the psychotherapist-privilege in federal law).
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confidential mental health counseling.  As recognized in the rule 
commentary, the military privilege “is a separate rule based on the social 
benefit of confidential counseling recognized by Jaffee, and similar to the 
clergy-penitent privilege.”197   The psychotherapist privilege thus 
facilitates a wider policy goal of encouraging servicemembers to seek 
help, albeit balanced against the special considerations of the military 
context. As also noted in the MRE commentary, these exceptions largely 
exist to further operational and mission success: 
In deciding to adopt this privilege for courts-martial, the 
committee balanced the policy of following federal law 
and rules, when practicable and not inconsistent with the 
UCMJ or MCM, with the needs of commanders for 
knowledge of certain types of information affecting the 
military.  The exceptions to the rule have been developed 
to address the specialized society of the military and 
separate concerns that must be met to ensure military 
readiness and national security.198 
Thus, unlike the absolute privilege clergy have with Rule 503, there 
are seven significant exceptions to Rule 513.  No psychotherapist privilege 
applies when the patient dies,199 in communications which are evidence of 
child abuse/neglect, or in a proceeding in which a spouse is charged with 
a crime against a child or either spouse,200 when federal or state law or 
service regulations require reporting of information,201 when the 
psychotherapist believes the patient is a danger to others or himself,202 in 
communications involving future commissions of crime,203 when 
197  See MCM, supra note 24, at analysis at App. 22-51 (“Rule 513 is not a physician-
patient privilege.  It is a separate rule based on the social benefit of confidential   
counseling recognized by Jaffee, and similar to the clergy-penitent privilege.”). 
198  Id. 
199  See MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(1) (stating privilege does not exist “when the patient is 
dead”). 
200 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(2) (stating privilege does not exist “when the 
communication is evidence of child abuse or of neglect, or in a proceeding in which one 
spouse is charged with a crime against a child of either spouse” ).  
201 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(3) (stating privilege does not exist “when federal law, 
state law, or service regulation imposes a duty to report information”).  
202    See MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(4) (stating privilege does not exist “when a 
psychotherapist or assistant to a psychotherapist believes that a patient's mental or 
emotional condition makes the patient a danger to any person, including the patient”).  
203 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(5) (stating privilege does not exist “if the 
communication clearly contemplated the future commission of a fraud or crime”).  
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necessary to ensure safety of military personnel, property, or missions,204 
and when a defendant provides information about his mental conditions 
pursuant to a military case not covered under other privileges.205 The 
exceptions generally mirror those found in state law206 and are thus very 
broad. 
It is significant to note that the psychotherapist privilege has recently 
been amended for policy reasons.  Prior to 2015, the privilege contained 
an eighth exception for “when admission of disclosure of a communication 
is constitutionally required.”207  This exception was often exploited by 
defense counsel to introduce mental health information as evidence for 
witness impeachment,208 and was criticized for being particularly 
problematic in cases involving sexual assault.209  The amendment 
removing that exception was directed through the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2015 Subtitle D, Military Justice, 
Including Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Prevention and 
Response,210 ostensibly reflecting congressional intent to reform Uniform 
Code of Military Justice and MRE provisions dealing with the problem of 
sexual assault and violence in the military.211  Eliminating the 
204 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(6) (stating privilege does not exist “when necessary to 
ensure the safety and security of military personnel, military dependents, military 
property, classified information, or the accomplishment of a military mission”).  
205 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(7) (stating privilege does not exist “when an accused 
offers statements or other evidence concerning his mental condition in defense, 
extenuation, or mitigation, under circumstances not covered by R.C.M. 706 or Mil. R. 
Evid. 302”).  
206  For a discussion of legal requirements implicating confidentiality of psychotherapists, 
see Bruce Sales, Mark DeKraai, Susan Hall & Julie Duvall, Child Therapy and the Law, 
in THE PRACTICE OF CHILD THERAPY 519-542 (Richard Morris & Thomas 
Kratochwill eds., 4th ed., 2007);  Mark DeKraai & Bruce Sales, Confidential 
communications of psychotherapists, 21 Psychotherapy 293-318 (1984); Mark DeKraai 
& Bruce Sales, Privileged communications of psychologists, 13 Professional 
Psychology: Research and Practice 382 – 388 (1982). 
207  Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(8) (2012). 
208  See Major Michael Zimmerman, Rudderless: 15 Years and Still Little Direction on 
the Boundaries of Military Rule of Evidence 513, 223 MIL. L. REV. 312, 313 (2015) 
(discussing the scenario of using the constitutionality exception in defenses to impeach 
witnesses based on mental health information).   
209  See Major Angel M. Overgaard, Redefining the Narrative: Why Changes to Military 
Rule of Evidence 513 Require Courts to Treat the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege as 
Nearly Absolute. 224 MIL. L. REV. 979, 980-81 (2016) (discussing the scenario of 
defense counsel using the constitutionality exception in sexual assault cases, and 
asserting that the “privilege’s misapplication was re-victimization of sexual assault 
victims”).  
210  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291 
[hereinafter NDAA 2015].  
211 See Overgaard, supra note 228 at 982-83 (discussing congressional intent and 
national interest in preventing sexual assault and providing due protections to victims).  
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constitutionality exception thus prevented the possibility of a broad search 
through a potential victim’s therapy records on the basis of 
constitutionality for purposes of impeachment, a concern the MRE 
drafting committee had when crafting the exceptions.212  
Similarly, the NDAA of 2015 also clarified the procedural 
requirements for MRE 513 hearings.  Prior to the changes, if a party sought 
to introduce evidence in which there was a dispute as to whether it was 
covered by an exception, the rule simply stated that the military judge must 
first examine the evidence in camera, though no further guidance was 
provided as to when that would be appropriate.213  Thus, highly sensitive 
information could be easily reviewed in closed sessions.  As discussed at 
length by Major Michael Zimmerman,214 the 2015 amendments 
incorporated elements from the Klemick case,215 discussed infra,216 
establishing clear thresholds necessary to conduct in camera review of the 
mental health information.  This includes a finding by the judge by a 
preponderance of evidence that the moving party has shown a reasonable 
likelihood that the evidence fits under one of the MRE 513 exceptions,217 
is not cumulative of other information,218 and the moving party made 
reasonable efforts to obtain the same information from non-privileged 
sources.219  The NDAA amendments also provided victims the right to 
212 See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, MIL. R. EVID. 514 (2012), analysis at 
App. 22-46 (discussing exceptions to MRE 513 and 514 and noting concern that “this 
relatively high standard of release is not intended to invite a fishing expedition for possible 
statements made by the victim, nor is it intended to be an exception that effectively 
renders the privilege meaningless”).  See also Major Cormac M. Smith, Applying the New 
Military Rule of Evidence 513:  How Adopting Wisconsin’s Interpretation of the 
Psychotherapist Privilege Protects Victims and Improves Military Justice, THE ARMY 
LAWYER, Nov. 2015, 6, at 6 (describing the scenario where sexual assault victims’ 
psychotherapy records are produced for in camera review under the constitutionality 
exception);  Zimmerman, supra note 227 at 329-333 (discussing concern brought about by 
the constitutionality exception that would allow searching through very private and 
personal mental health records of victims).  
213 See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, MIL. R. EVID. 513(3)(3) (2012) 
(stating that review of evidence must be done by a military judge in camera).  For an 
example of a pre-Klemick case in which in camera review of mental health records with 
little additional guidance is presumed, see United States v. Harding, 63 M.J. 65 
(C.A.A.F. 2006).  
214  See Zimmerman, supra note 227 at 331-336 (discussing post-NDAA 2015 
requirements to MRE 513 derived from the Klemick case).  
215  65 M.J. 576 (2006). 
216  See discussion infra on the 2006 Klemick case at notes 261-270. 
217  MCM, supra note 24, MIL. R. EVID. 513(e)(3)(A-B). 
218  Id. at MIL. R. EVID. 513(e)(3)(C).  
219  Id. at MIL. R. EVID. 513(e)(3)(D). 
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petition for a writ of mandamus to compel compliance to these 
requirements if they believed they were being violated.220 
Another noteworthy addition in the 2015 amendments to the rule 
included an expansion of the definition of psychotherapists to include 
other mental health professionals.221  Previously, the privilege’s definition 
of a psychotherapist was restricted to a psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, 
or clinical social worker.222  Expanding that definition to include other 
mental health professionals ostensibly indicates that professionals such as 
licensed professional counselors, alcohol and drug abuse counselors, nurse 
psychotherapists, and marital and family therapists, may also now be 
covered by the privilege.  In theory, this broadening of the definition 
of psychotherapists should also include pastoral counselors—clergy 
members with clinical training to provide counseling or psychotherapy.  
Some states do specifically license clinical pastoral therapists, or if not, 
pastoral counselors can apply for and practice as other types of mental 
health professionals, such as licensed marriage and family therapists.223  
Pastoral counselors typically blend clinical psychotherapy and counseling 
techniques with their theological and spiritual training to address issues 
like addiction and recovery, relationships, and spiritual and moral 
injuries.224  The inclusion of pastoral counselors as psychotherapists 
covered by Rule 513 has important implications for clearly identifying 
relationships, roles, and ethical boundaries during interactions with 
patients and other professionals in a mental health setting.  
By both removing the constitutionality exception, and expanding the 
coverage of the privilege to include a greater scope of mental health 
professionals, Congress effectively strengthened the psychotherapy 
privilege, a trend which ostensibly facilitates the goal of encouraging 
servicemembers to seek confidential mental health counseling from 
qualified professionals.  
220  See NDAA 2015, supra note 229, at §537(1) (providing for victims to petition for a 
writ of mandamus to enforce compliance with the MRE 412 and 513). 
221  See id. §537(1) (stating that Rule 513 be expanded to cover “other licensed mental 
health professionals”).  
222  See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, MIL. R. EVID. 514 (2012), 
223 See American Association of Pastoral Counselors, Licensing, 
http://www.aapc.org/Default.aspx?ssid=74&NavPTypeId=1189 (last visited April 6, 
2017) (outlining state licensing status for pastoral counselors). 
224 See generally, ROBERT J. WICKS, RICHARD D. PARSONS, & DONALD CAPPS, CLINICAL
HANDBOOK OF PASTORAL COUNSELING, VOL. 1 (1993). 
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A. Setting the foundations in Jenkins and Klemick
Two early cases in which a military court examined the new privilege 
of Rule 513 were United States v. Rodriguez (C.A.A.F. 2000)225 and 
United States v. Paaluhi (C.A.A.F. 2000).226 Rodriguez involved a 
defendant stationed in Bosnia who rigged a weapon to shoot himself in 
order to avoid duty.  During counseling treatment with a psychiatrist, 
Rodriguez admitted he intentionally shot himself to get out of duty and 
was not suicidal.  That testimony was later introduced in his court-martial, 
and he was subsequently found guilty of wounding himself to avoid 
hazardous duty.227  The shooting, communication with the psychiatrist, 
and original court-martial all took place prior to when Rule 513 was 
established.  Rodriguez argued to the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces that the psychotherapist privilege prevented the testimony from 
being introduced, but the court instead ruled that because the military 
psychotherapist privilege was not yet in force at the time of the activity in 
question, it did not shield the communications.228   Similarly, Paaluhi 
involved a defendant’s confession to a Navy psychologist that he had been 
having sexual relations with his stepdaughter, though those 
communications also occurred before the military psychotherapist 
privilege had been recognized.229   As in Rodriguez, the Court of Appeals 
for the Armed Forces also ruled that the privilege did not apply because 
the incriminating statements were made in 1996, prior to the creation of 
the privilege.230    
It was not until 2006 that the courts examined two cases with 
significant substantive repercussions.  One was United States v. Jenkins 
(C.A.A.F. 2006),231 in which the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
scrutinized the breadth of the exceptions under Rule 513. The other major 
case was United States v. Klemick (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2006).232 
Klemick established parameters for Rule 513 hearings that would later be 
225  54 M.J. 156 (C.A.A.F. 2000).  
226  54 M.J. 181 (C.A.A.F. 2000). 
227  See Rodriguez, 54 M.J. 156, 156-158 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (stating background facts to the 
case). 
228  See 54 M.J. at 160-61 (finding that presidential intent towards the psychotherapist 
privilege controlled the outcomes of the case). 
229 See id. at 182-84 (discussing the timing and background of Paaluhi’s communications 
to the Navy clinical psychologist). 
230 See id. at 183 (holding no military psychotherapist privilege existed at the time of the 
activity in question). 
231  63 M.J. 426 (C.A.A.F. 2006). 
232  65 M.J. 576 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2006). 
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incorporated into the 2015 NDAA amendments, and is thus significant for 
strengthening the psychotherapist privilege in light of its many exceptions. 
In Jenkins, the defendant was drunk and accosted a black airman with 
racial taunts.  During the confrontation, Jenkins drew a knife and chased 
the airman while yelling “I’m going to kill y’all n****** tonight.”  He 
was apprehended by military police and released the next day, and ordered 
to walk home by the officer in charge.  He then told friends about the 
officer in command: “That f****** bitch made me mad . . . I would have 
cut her f****** throat.”  His behavior was reported to command, and he 
was directed to a mental health evaluation by the command clinical 
psychologist.233 At his court-martial, the psychologist testified that Jenkins 
had abnormally high anger, low self-control, should be confined due to his 
danger to others, and should ultimately receive treatment outside of the 
military.234  He was subsequently found guilty on several charges of 
disorderly conduct, threats, and substance abuse, and ordered to jail time 
and then dishonorable discharge.235  
Before the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, Jenkins argued that 
the court-martial judge had erred by allowing the psychologist to testify 
via the “dangerousness” exceptions to the psychotherapist 
privilege: 513(d)(4)—when a psychotherapist believes the patient is a 
“danger to any person, including the patient”;236 and 513(d)(6)—– 
“when necessary to ensure the safety and security of military 
personnel.”237  He asserted that the exceptions were so broad and vague, 
that a reasonable Service member could not know what would or 
would not qualify under these dangerousness exceptions, and that 
their ambiguity was thus unfair to prospective mental health 
patients.238  The court recognized that the exceptions were broad, 
and their applicability necessitated a fact-specific inquiry by judges.239  
233  See id. at 427 (describing the defendant’s behavior).  
234 See id. at 428 (describing the findings and testimony of the clinical psychologist to 
Jenkins’ mental state of mind).  
235  See id. at 426 (describing charges and sentencing for defendant). 
236  MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(4). 
237  MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(6). 
238 See 63 M.J. at 429-430 (describing defendant’s arguments that the exceptions to 
Rule 513 were unfairly broad and demanded more specific definitions).  
239 See id. at 430 (noting that “Whether the exceptions apply is necessarily a fact-specific 
determination for a military judge to consider with an accurate awareness of the facts 
underlying the dispute, just as hearsay determinations necessarily involve context. It is for 
this reason that the M.R.E. forego detailed analyses of their application in different factual 
scenarios”).  
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In its ruling, the court declined to establish new tests, and held that the 
factual evidence was sufficient to indicate that the dangerousness 
exceptions applied.  Jenkins had chased another airman with a knife, 
threatened to kill the commanding officer, and the psychologist had tested 
and confirmed Jenkins’ anger and control issues.  The court concluded 
that, “[a]lthough we may not at this point be able to determine every 
context in which M.R.E. 513(d)(4) and (6) might apply, we conclude with 
confidence that the two exceptions were implicated when Appellant made 
threats to kill persons while brandishing a fourteen-inch knife.”240  Jenkins 
serves as a clear example of the rationale for these dangerousness 
exceptions to psychotherapy communications.  The court found no need 
to further narrow the exception language beyond the text of the rule.  The 
presence of actual death threats, as well as the findings of the clinical 
psychologist establishing the defendant’s dangerousness, were sufficient 
to trigger those exceptions to the psychotherapist privilege.   
United States v. Klemick241 involved a determination of whether a 
factual basis was necessary to review evidence in camera (in private) for 
admissibility under the Rule 513(d)(2) exception for communications that 
are evidence of child abuse.  Klemick had been charged with assault and 
manslaughter following the shaking death of his baby child.  During his 
court-martial, the government had sought admission of treatment 
information from discussions between Klemick’s wife and her 
psychotherapist following the child’s death.  The military prosecutor 
argued that the information could be introduced as an exception to the 
psychotherapist privilege because it was relevant to the case, over the 
protests of both Klemick and his wife, who was unavailable to testify due 
to a high-risk medical situation.242  The trial judge reviewed the 
psychotherapist records in camera, and then released portions of it to both 
the defense and prosecution to be potentially used in cross-examination as 
part of Rule 513(e) procedures for evidentiary review.243  Klemick was 
subsequently convicted of manslaughter, and argued on appeal that prior 
240  Id. at 431. 
241  65 M.J. 576 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2006). 
242 See id. at 578 (noting the argument that the psychotherapist records which 
show information about “substantive events in the instant case”).  
243 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(e)(2-3) (stating that “[b]efore ordering the production or 
admission of evidence of a patient's records or communication, the military judge shall 
conduct a hearing . . . The military judge shall examine the evidence or a proffer thereof 
in camera, if such examination is necessary to rule on the motion”).  
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to in camera review of evidence, some threshold indication of evidentiary 
relevance must be established to use the exception.244  
The Navy-Marine Court of Criminal Appeals noted that there was no 
prior precedent within military or federal law to the immediate question, 
and then looked to state law for relevant cases.245  Citing the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court case of Wisconsin v Green,246 the military court quoted 
Wisconsin’s ruling requiring in such circumstances “a specific factual 
basis demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that the records contain 
relevant information necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence 
and is not merely cumulative to other evidence.”247 Adapting this 
threshold, the Navy-Marine Court identified a three-part test for Rule 513 
requiring a determination of whether (1) a specific factual basis showed a 
“reasonable likelihood” that privileged records were admissible under the 
child abuse exception, (2) the information had independently probative 
value and was not just cumulative to other information already available, 
and (3) a requirement that reasonable efforts were made to obtain the 
“same or substantially similar information through non-privileged 
sources.”248 In Klemick, the government had satisfied each of these 
requirements.  The known facts of the case were enough to demonstrate 
the likelihood that the psychotherapist records of Klemick’s wife were 
reasonably likely to contain information related to child abuse, that 
information had independent probative value, and attempts had been made 
to interview the wife but were unsuccessful as she was experiencing 
medical issues.249  The Klemick ruling thus established the threshold to 
determine requirements for review of privileged communications, with the 
relevant standard being “reasonable likelihood” that it was admissible.  As 
noted supra,250 the Klemick analysis was incorporated into the NDAA 
2015 amendments as part of an effort to strengthen the privilege.    
244 See 65 M.J. at 579 (outlining the defendant’s arguments about that the 
“[g]overnment showing in this case was not sufficient to pierce the veil of privilege”).  
245 See id. (“We have found no applicable military or Federal case law. For their persuasive 
authority only, we will consider State appellate court decisions addressing the issue of 
prerequisites for in camera review under State psychotherapist-patient privilege rules 
similar to MIL. R. EVID. 513.”). 
246  253 Wis. 2d 356 (2002). 
247  See 65 M.J. at 579 (citing Wisconsin v. Greene, 253 Wis. 2d 356 (2002)). 
248  Id. at 580. 
249  See id. (outlining reasons why “the Government satisfied this three-part standard”). 
250 See footnotes 226-243 et seq and accompanying text discussing the NDAA 2015 
changes. 
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B. Introducing sexual behavior evidence via the constitutionality
exception to Rule 513: Nixon, Hohenstein, Palmer, and Hudgins 
United States v. Nixon (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2012),251 United 
States v. Hohenstein (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. July 1, 2013),252 United States 
v. Palmer (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2013),253 and United States v.
Hudgins (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2013),254 are pre-NDAA 2015
cases that illustrated how the constitutionality exception of MRE 513 was
litigated as a defense tactic.  Under this exception, a move to admit mental
health records under an argument that it furthered constitutional rights to
a fair trial (e.g. via the sixth amendment) was possible.  Defense would
also seek to introduce evidence about sexual behavior that would bypass
MRE 412,255 the military rape shield provision (which was also
strengthened under NDAA 2015 amendments to protect victims of sexual
assault).256
United States v. Nixon257 was an appeal based on an asserted error in 
the introduction of potential impeachment or exculpatory evidence. 
Defendant Nixon allegedly sexually assaulted three of his daughters, 
which he had admitted to his wife.258 Nixon was subsequently convicted 
of rape and sentenced to 18 years confinement.259 Prior to his court-
martial, the military judge had reviewed in camera the mental health 
records of his wife and three daughters, and subsequently released a 
summarized portion of the records – but not all of them – to the defense 
and prosecution.  On appeal to the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, 
Nixon argued that the judge erred by not releasing all of those records, as 
they arguably would have showed that A) one of his daughters had been 
untruthful about her sexual activity, and B) another daughter may have 
been sexually abused by her brother, not Nixon, and that her recollection 
about who assaulted her may thus not have been correct.260  To support his 
assertion, Nixon relied on the Military Rules of Court Martial 
251  2012 WL 5991775 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2012). 
252  2013 WL 3971576 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. July 1, 2013) 
253  2013 WL 6579713 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2013). 
254  2014 WL 2038866 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 3, 2014). 
255  MCM, supra note 24, MIL. R. EVID. 412. 
256  See NDAA 2015, supra note 229, at §537(1) (providing for victims to petition for a 
writ of mandamus to enforce compliance with the MRE 412 and 513). 
257  2012 WL 5991775 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2012). 
258  See id. at 1 (discussing facts involving Nixon’s sexual assaults on his daughters). 
259  See id. (discussing court-martial and sentencing of defendant). 
260 See id. at 16 (outlining Nixon’s arguments that information not released may have 
altered or mitigated the case against him). 
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701(a)(2)(B), which allow the defense in discovery to obtain “results or 
reports of physical or mental examinations . . . which are within the 
possession, custody, or control of military authorities . . . and which are 
material to the preparation of the defense or are intended for use by the 
trial counsel as evidence in the prosecution case-in-chief at trial.”261  
The court disagreed with Nixon.  It noted that Rule of Evidence 412262 
prevents the admission of evidence of a victim’s sexual behavior unless it 
is offered to prove someone other than the accused was the source of 
semen, injury or other evidence, proves consent, or violates the 
constitutional rights of the accused.263  It also noted that despite the Courts-
Martial Rule 701(a)(2)(B), Rule 513 protects psychotherapist records.264 
In this case, the court held that the information from the records was 
appropriately withheld by the trial judge because its alleged contents 
261  Rules for Court Martial 701(a)(2)(B).
262  See MIL. R. EVID. 412(a)(1-2): 
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible.  The following evidence is not
admissible in any proceeding involving an alleged sexual offense
except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other
sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim’s sexual
predisposition.
Id.  It is noted in the official commentary to the Military Rules of Evidence that the purpose 
of Rule 412 is “intended to shield victims of sexual assaults from the often embarrassing 
and degrading cross-examination and evidence presentations common to prosecutions of 
such offenses.”  See MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL UNITED STATES A22-36 (2012). 
263  See MIL. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A-C):  
(1) In a proceeding, the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise
admissible under these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than the
accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical
evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
alleged victim with respect to the person accused of the
sexual misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent
or by the prosecution; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the
constitutional rights of the accused.
Id. 
264  See 2012 WL 5991775 at 17 (stating that “Mil. R. Evid. 513(a) protects the records 
covered under R.C.M. 701(f), and none of the exceptions under Mil. R. Evid. 513(d)(1)-
(8) justify disclosure in the case sub judice”).
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amounted to an “alleged act of a third party, and not the accused.”265  The 
alleged content would not have resulted in a reasonable probability that its 
disclosure would have changed the result of the case in light of the totality 
of the evidence, as enough evidence existed pointing to Nixon’s guilt, and 
it would outweigh any probative value of speculation that the records may 
have helped Nixon’s position.266  Finally, the contents of the records were 
not admissible under any of the exceptions of Rule 412.267  
United States v. Hohenstein268 featured a similar discovery-based 
argument as that in Nixon.  Defendant Hohenstein had allegedly sexually 
assaulted a friend of his daughter’s during a sleepover.  Hohenstein denied 
the assault had occurred.269 The trial record showed that in addition to the 
assault, there was a dispute about whether the victim had been truthful 
about another sexual assault that had allegedly occurred a year earlier by 
a different perpetrator.270  The military judge, however, had not introduced 
evidence of that prior alleged assault as it was prevented by Rule of 
Evidence 412, which bars admissibility of evidence of prior sexual 
behavior unrelated to the immediate case.271  Hohenstein argued that 
evidence of her untruthfulness regarding the prior assault should be used 
to question her credibility.272 Following his conviction, the Air Force 
Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the trial judge had correctly excluded 
evidence regarding the alleged prior assault because it was not relevant to 
Hohenstein’s case and risked prejudice towards the victim.273  Hohenstein 
also argued that the judge erred by not admitting evidence from the 
victim’s discussions with a psychotherapist, which he argued was 
admissible under Rule 513(d)(8) (no psychotherapy privilege “when 
admission or disclosure of a communication is constitutionally required”), 
because he could use that information to impeach the victim.274  The court 
265  Id. at 17. 
266  See id. at 18 (noting that the alleged information not disclosed, in order to be material 
to Nixon’s case, had to have been information that would have created a reasonable 
probability that its disclosure would have resulted in a different conclusion). 
267  See id. (noting that “[f]inally, even if the appellant was entitled to discover this 
information, Mil. R. Evid. 412 barred its admission, and none of the exceptions under Mil. 
R. Evid. 412(b) apply”).
268  2013 WL 3971576 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. July 1, 2013).
269  See id. at 1-2 (discussing the facts of the case).
270  See id. at 1-2 (discussing the alleged sexual assault a year earlier).
271  See MIL. R. EVID. 412(a)(1-2) (barring evidence about a victim’s prior sexual behavior).
272  See 2013 WL 3971576 at 2 (outlining the appellant’s argument about judicial error).
273  See id. at 4 (agreeing with the trial judge that the evidence of the prior alleged sexual
assault was correctly excluded under Rule 412).
274  See id. at 5 (discussing the alleged error under Rule 513).
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also ruled against Hohenstein on this point, noting that the trial judge had 
correctly reviewed the psychotherapist records in camera, found that there 
was no or little information relevant to the defense within the privileged 
information, and thus properly excluded it.275  The Hohenstein ruling, 
along with Nixon, confirmed that the courts are reluctant to admit evidence 
from psychotherapy records via the 513 child abuse ((d)(2)) or 
constitutionality ((d)(8)) exceptions, though they also reflect how the 
constitutionality exception served as an opportunity for defense counsel to 
exploit.      
Palmer involved an assignment for error regarding a trial judge’s 
discretion in the limited release of psychotherapist records.  Palmer was 
the next door neighbor of the alleged victim.  During a night of drinking 
at his house, Palmer slipped some GHB “date rape” drug into the victim’s 
drink, and sexually assaulted and raped her while she was unconscious. 
Upon waking up, she was taken to the hospital for examination, where 
doctors found both traces of GHB in her urine, and physical evidence of 
the sexual assault.276 The victim also testified to having nightmares and 
being emotionally upset after the experience.277 Palmer was subsequently 
convicted by the trial judge of rape, and sentenced to four years in prison. 
Before the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, Palmer argued that 
the trial judge had erred by not allowing further evidence from the victim’s 
psychotherapist records be used in cross-examination.278 Prior to the rape, 
the victim had been seeing a psychotherapist and had taken a mental health 
questionnaire with forty-five questions on it.  Several weeks after the rape, 
she re-took the same questionnaire.  The military judge had released all 
records to both parties prior to trial, but only allowed the defense to cross-
examine the victim on 5 of the 45 questions.  Palmer’s argument was that 
being allowed to cross-examine her on all the questions would have shown 
that her test results had not changed following the incident, indicating that 
the rape did not badly affect her.279  
275 See id. (stating “[w]e agree with the military judge. As he pointed out, the evidence 
in the mental health records was ‘scant.’”)  
276  See Palmer, supra note 273 at 1-3 (describing the facts of the case). 
277 See id. at 4 (noting that the victim had testified about having nightmares and 
becoming upset whenever she encountered the perpetrator after the attack).  
278 See id. (outlining Palmer’s assertions on appeal regarding the victim’s mental health 
records). 
279 See id. (“The trial defense counsel's argument was that her overall interpersonal 
relations score remained essentially the same, which showed she was not affected by the  
rape.”). 
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In its review of the trial judge’s discretion, the court noted that judges 
“have broad discretion to impose reasonable limitations on cross-
examination”280 as per Rule 513(e)(4) procedures in the judge’s 
determination of admissibility of patient records.281  However, the Rule 
513(8) exception allowing disclosure of communication when 
constitutionally required still requires admission of evidence if it is 
necessary for one’s constitutional right to confront witnesses under the 
sixth amendment.282  In the immediate case, the victim had testified about 
having nightmares after the incident, and the trial judge had restricted 
cross-examination using the questionnaire only to those items relevant to 
that specific testimony, and not all the mental health records.  The court 
thus concluded that this narrowing by the trial judge had “struck an 
appropriate balance between the appellant's constitutional rights and the 
alleged victim's privileged communications to her mental health 
provider.”283  The conviction of Palmer was therefore upheld. 
Hudgins284 involved a similar situation to that of Palmer.  In Hudgins, 
the defendant allegedly raped two airwomen in two different and separate 
times.  Physical medical examination had confirmed at least one of the 
sexual assaults.  One victim had reported the alleged rape weeks after it 
had occurred, only after experiencing nightmares and her boyfriend 
encouraged her to report it to her command.  Hudgins had denied the 
charges and testified that the sex was consensual.  The trial judge 
reviewed records from a psychotherapist the victim had been seeing, and 
released selected amounts to the defense.285  Hudgins was ultimately 
convicted of the charges, but on appeal he argued the trial judge had 
erred by not providing more of the victim’s psychotherapist records 
under the constitutionality exception of Rule 513(d)(8).286  He argued the 
theory that the 
280 See 2013 WL 6579713 at 4 (citing U.S. v. McElhaney, 54 M.J. 120, 
129 (C.A.A.F.2000)).  
281 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(e)(4) (“To prevent unnecessary disclosure of evidence of 
patient's records or communications, the military judge may issue protective orders 
or may a admit only portions of the evidence.”). 
282 See id. at 4-5 (discussing the constitutionality requirements regarding cross 
examination and exceptions to privileged psychotherapist records).  
283  Id. at 5. 
284  2014 WL 2038866 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 3, 2014). 
285 See id. at 1-4 (discussing the factual background to the case and the situation 
involving airman A1C PS).  
286   See id. at 5 (outlining the defendant’s arguments that more of the victim’s mental 
records should have been release because they were constitutionally required for at least 
two reasons). 
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psychotherapist records would have shown the victim’s relationship with 
her boyfriend was not strong, and that she made up the allegation of assault 
so her boyfriend would not know the sex was consensual.287  
In reviewing Hudgins’ argument, the appellate court recognized that 
Rule 513(d)(8) required disclosure of psychotherapist records when 
constitutionally required.288 It applied an analysis to determine if any error 
in not releasing further records was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.289 Noting that the records in question did not have any compelling 
evidence to show a poor relationship between the victim and her 
boyfriend, and the fact that defense counsel had an opportunity to cross 
examine the victim on the alleged issue but did not, the appellate court 
decided that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus 
had no or little impact on the court-martial to find that the information was 
constitutionally required.290  
D. Synopsis of Rule 513 Cases 
Significant case law surrounding Military Rule of Evidence 513 case 
law has largely focused on evidence admissibility issues for information 
covered under one of the rule’s broad exceptions.  The Klemick case, and 
the incorporation of the court’s holding into the post-NDAA 2015 Rule 
513, have provided additional protections for mental health records by 
closing the constitutionality exception and clarifying the evidentiary 
287  See id.: 
“He argues such records were constitutionally required for two 
reasons: (1) The defense could have used the records to counter A1C 
PS's testimony in the Mil. R. Evid. 412 hearing that her relationship 
with her boyfriend was very strong; and (2) The statements in the 
mental health records could have supported the defense's theory that 
A1C PS fabricated the sexual assault allegation to cover up a 
consensual sexual encounter with the appellant out of fear that her 
boyfriend would be upset with her.” 
Id. 
288 See id. (citing Rule 513(d)(8) regarding the constitutional exception to 
the psychotherapist privilege record).  
289 See 2014 WL 2038866 at 5-6 (examining the trial judge’s admittance of evidence 
to determine if an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).  
290 See id. at 5 (“Trial defense counsel's own actions therefore demonstrate that 
the additional evidence contained in A1C PS's mental health records was not so 
probative as to be constitutionally required, or if it was required to be disclosed, its 
absence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).  
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threshold for in camera review of evidence for introduction.  These 
changes presumably support the wider policy objectives of protecting 
victim’s rights, as well as encouraging individuals to seek help from 
psychotherapists without fear that highly personal information would be 
used in cross-examination. 
Outside of these cases, there is a dearth in case law examining the 
other parameters of the Rule 513 exceptions.  Jenkins remains a vitally 
important holding.  The narrow ruling indicates that testimony of a 
psychotherapist will be allowed under the dangerousness exception if the 
behavior of the person at issue rises to level of assault and death threats. 
This suggests that courts will examine the total circumstances of a case to 
determine if a psychotherapist’s assessment of an individual as dangerous 
is warranted.  The broader relevance of Jenkins is that it reflects judicial 
deference to psychotherapists’ determinations of dangerousness, and the 
extent to which the psychotherapist privilege is limited by the exception. 
This clearly reflects the valid military concerns of ensuring the safety and 
security of other personnel, and the success of military operations and 
missions.   
V.  Conclusion:  Towards Guidance for Chaplains and Mental Health 
Practitioners in the Military 
We found no cases directly involving chaplains and mental health 
providers working together in a military context, either by design or 
happenstance.  Additionally, we found no instances of official regulation 
for the joint handling of confidential, sensitive information by chaplains 
and mental health providers working together.  This seems to suggest that 
this is an area in need of policy guidance, particularly given the fact that 
the handling of sensitive mental health-related information is a significant 
concern for many servicemembers, and that efforts to integrate chaplains 
and mental health providers together have become more pronounced with 
the Integrated Mental Health Strategy.  Recent surveys conducted by the 
DoD to explore implementation strategies of the Integrated Mental Health 
Strategy indicate that military chaplains welcome collaboration with 
mental health professionals.291  The desire by both professionals in the 
field and leadership to improve collaboration also justifies a 
291 See Jason A. Nieuwsma et al., Chaplaincy and mental health in the Department of 
Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense, 19 J. HEALTH CARE CHAPLAINCY 3, 13 (2013) 
(discussing results of DVA / DoD chaplain survey which indicated 95% support for closer 
collaboration between chaplains and mental health professionals). 
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reconsideration of how the military rules of evidence would facilitate such 
collaboration, and whether any changes to the rules, or to practices, are 
necessary. 
This review of the MRE 503 and 513 case law is helpful in 
conceptualizing how each rule facilitates the wider policy rationales of 
each privilege, and its applicability to the current needs of the military. 
Developments in Rule 513 demonstrate an adherence to wider policy 
goals.  As recognized by the Supreme Court in Jaffee and the MCM 
commentary, the policy rationale behind the psychotherapist privilege 
codified in MRE 513 is to encourage servicemembers to seek help and 
counseling from mental health professionals.292  This rationale is, 
however, balanced against the military interests of preventing dangers to 
oneself or others, criminal activities, or other issues that jeopardize safety, 
security, and the success of military missions.293  This includes exceptions 
for other compelling societal and military interests, such as preventing 
child abuse.294  Appellate case law surrounding MRE 513 reflected how 
the constitutionality exception of the rule allowed for mental health 
records to be scrutinized in courts.  The NDAA 2015 amendments 
eliminating that exception thus reflect a clear intent to strengthen the 
psychotherapist privilege, furthering the policy of encouraging 
servicemembers to seek help from psychotherapists without a concern that 
such very personal information might be reviewable in evidentiary 
hearings.  This development should thus be welcome by patient-
servicemembers, plaintiff-victims, mental health professionals, and the 
military in general. 
Whereas the policy rationale of the psychotherapist privilege is to 
encourage help-seeking behavior among servicemembers, the historical 
and still main policy reason behind MRE 503 is to facilitate free 
expression of religion within the services.295  Courts like Moreno have 
recognized that this includes safeguarding communications between 
individuals and clergyman about deeply personal, troubling matters.296  
292 See supra footnotes 208-216 and accompanying discussion about the policy 
rationale behind Rule 513.   
293 See MCM, supra note 24, MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(1-7) (listing exceptions to 
the psychotherapist privilege).  
294  See id. at (d)(2) (stating no privilege for evidence of child abuse or neglect). 
295 See supra footnotes 77-84 and accompanying discussion about the policy rationale 
behind Rule 503.  
296 See United States v. Moreno, 20 M.J. 623 (A.C.M.R. 1985): 
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Cases under MRE 503 such as Beattie, Isham, and others, do indeed 
indicate that, at times, military chaplains are confronted with situations 
that present clear and sometimes immediate dangers.297  Although it is 
unclear how often this occurs, it does raise legitimate questions about 
the clergy privilege.  Commenters have debated why, for example, 
the compelling state interest in protecting children from abuse does not 
apply to military chaplains vis-a-vis an exception to privileged 
communications, when it does for military psychotherapists and 
their civilian clergy counterparts through state law.298  No official 
rationale has been offered by military or courts to precisely explain the 
uniquely absolute privilege military clergy maintain, but it is likely 
a combination of historical deference to the profession, an 
unwillingness by the military to intrude on religious expression 
generally, and most importantly, a recognition that weakening the 
privilege would dis-incentivize confidential communications and 
counseling with chaplains.  The absolute nature of the privilege thus 
seems to affirm an unspoken position by the military placing great 
value on the importance of completely confidential 
communications with chaplains and its role in troop morale and 
military life.  This policy position is affirmed in rulings like Beattie 
and Isham, which recognize an important role for chaplains in 
referring troubled servicemembers to others in cases of immediate 
danger, while maintaining the confidentiality of communications.299   
The desire of the military to integrate chaplains more prominently in 
mental health presents at least two different policy approaches.  
Professional military chaplains, such as certified pastoral counselors, have 
shown both greater aptitude and willingness to address servicemembers’ 
mental health issues.  This signifies an opportunity to potentially expand 
the role of military chaplaincy from its historical role of facilitating 
freedom of religious expression to a more pronounced and specific role in 
The privilege regarding communications with a clergyman 
reflects an accommodation between the public's right to 
evidence and the individual's need to be able to speak with a 
spiritual counselor, in absolute confidence, and disclose the 
wrongs done or evils thought and receive spiritual absolution, 
consolation, or guidance in return. 
Id. at 626. 
297 See supra footnotes 111-122 and accompanying discussion on MRE 503 cases. 
298 For a comprehensive discussion of this debate, see Shane Cooper, Chaplains Caught in 
the Middle: The Military’s ‘Absolute’ Penitent-Clergy Privilege Meets State “Mandatory’ 
Child Abuse Reporting Laws, 49 NAVAL L. R. 128 (2002). 
299  See supra footnotes 111-122 and accompanying discussion on MRE 503 cases. 
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facilitating spiritual care within the larger military health system.  The 
argument for doing so would be grounded in two general assertions.  First 
would be that spiritual well-being plays an important role in overall well-
being and health, and that chaplains are uniquely fit to address this role.300  
The second assertion would be that chaplains already play a defacto role 
as informal (and sometimes formal) mental health professionals, in 
addition to their traditional role of facilitating religious expression.  A 
formal recognition of a shift in the overall responsibilities of military 
chaplains would be a major sea change in policy, however.  Arguably, such 
a shift might involve a corresponding change in the MRE 503 as well, but 
such a debate would involve multiple considerations.  We would anticipate 
that major questions would revolve around the extent to which the absolute 
privilege for clergy would be suitable in situations where chaplains assume 
a role that falls outside of religious communications, and into the realm of 
psychotherapy.  The related major question would therefore be whether 
“spiritual care” is a part of religious communications (covered under MRE 
503), or psychotherapy (covered under MRE 513), and identifying where 
the line between the two exists.     
A second approach, and likely the approach that will be maintained for the 
foreseeable future, is maintenance of the status quo in terms of the official 
roles of chaplains and psychotherapists in the military, and their respective 
privileges of communication.  However, this does not diminish the need 
to address the need to better facilitate integration and collaboration 
between the two professions in terms of improving practices.  For 
example, the presence of chaplains in treatment settings is not new, but 
their role as an active treatment team member may not be fully 
understood by servicemembers who have expectations of complete 
confidentiality in 
300  Numerous studies have linked spiritual health, religiosity, and well-being with the 
presence or absence of depression or other mental health issues, substance abuse issues, 
and health resiliency in general.  This can be particularly prominent among military 
veterans and/or PTSD survivors.  See for example, Kenneth Pargament & Patrick J. 
Sweeney, Building Spiritual Fitness in the Army: An Innovative Approach to a Vital 
Aspect of Human Development, 66 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 58 (2011) (presenting the 
conceptual model for spiritual fitness within the U.S. Army).  Numerous studies or 
models have linked spiritual health, religiosity, and well-being with the presence or 
absence of depression or other mental health issues, substance abuse issues, and health 
resiliency in general.  See Jill Bormann et al., Spiritual Wellbeing Mediates PTSD 
Change in Veterans with Military-Related PTSD, 19 INTL. J. BEHAVIORAL MED. 
496 (2012); Joseph m. Currier et al., Spiritual Functioning among Veterans Seeking 
Residential Treatment for PTSD: A Matched Control Group Study, 1 SPIRITUALITY 
IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 3 (2014); Brett Litz et al., Moral Injury and Moral Repair in 
War Veterans: A preliminary Model and Intervention Strategy, 29 CLINICAL PSYCH. 
R. 695 92009).
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their interactions with them.  Commenters have offered suggestions for 
how practices can be improved to clarify role boundaries and expectations, 
and develop or augment systems of support to further collaboration, 
effective communication, and positive outcomes for servicemembers.  For 
example, credentialing of chaplains to work in mental health environments 
within military settings should include guidance to assist chaplains as they 
navigate the roles they occupy as spiritual advisors in conjunction with 
that of mental health treatment team member.301  Standard language should 
be developed for chaplain use to explain the limits of privilege and the 
type of information they will share with other team members.  
Additionally, clear guidance must be made available to mental health 
professionals about what to expect from chaplains participating on 
treatment teams and the role of chaplains in general.302  In cases where 
referrals to or from mental health professionals or chaplains to the other is 
an appropriate option, clear protocols should be developed for 
communications of necessary information while adhering to 
confidentiality.303  The ultimate goal of such recommendations is to 
enhance access to safe, coordinated, quality mental health care for 
servicemembers that recognizes spiritual care as a treatment component. 
301 See Denise Bulling et al., Confidentiality and Mental Health/Chaplaincy 
Collaboration, 25 MIL. PSYCH. 557, 565 (2014) (discussing recommendations for 
training chaplains to collaborate with mental health professionals). 
302  See Jason A. Nieuwsma et al., Chaplaincy and mental health in the Department of 
Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense, 19 J. HEALTH CARE CHAPLAINCY 3, 
9-10 (2013) (discussing the need to improve understanding and trust between mental 
health professionals and chaplains in order to promote collaboration). 
303 See Jason A. Nieuwsma et al., Improving Patient-Centered Care via Integration of 
Chaplains with Mental Health Care, DVA/DoD Joint Incentive Fund project final report 
26 (2015) (outlining progress towards streamlining and adjusting referral practices 
between mental health and chaplaincy within DVA and DoD settings).   
